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ABSTRACT  
 
  This thesis provides a comprehensive review of an emerging criminal phenomenon: online 
sexual extortion. The conduct is part of a growing category of criminal acts characterised by 
the use of technology to commit sexual offences. This research follows on from recent 
academic, media and political discussion on related issues such as the non-consensual 
distribution of intimate images and ‘up-skirting’. However, unlike these wrongs, online 
sexual extortion has received little treatment, particularly from a Scottish perspective. 
  In examining this issue, the thesis begins by drawing on existing literature in formulating 
a definition of online sexual extortion, with a broad definition being advocated. In 
recognising that the conduct is highly differentiated, a typology of the conduct is presented 
by reference to cases reported in the media and discussed in the literature. The focus then 
turns to coverage of the problem in Scotland. This is done by providing a review of leading 
literature on both the law and wider issues in this area. Statistical data is then analysed in 
order to chart the scale of the problem in Scotland, with it being concluded that online sexual 
extortion represents a growing threat that requires intervention. The thesis proceeds by 
examining the nature of the harms. It is argued that a distinct range of harms are experienced 
by victims and that these harms are exacerbated by the use of technology. Building on this, 
the multiple ways in which the conduct may infringe a victim’s sexual autonomy are 
discussed. It is proposed that the wrong must be characterised as a sexual offence and that 
there are important conceptual and practical consequences of doing this. Additional 
violations in terms of damage to privacy and reputation along with financial harm are also 
examined. It is concluded that these factors collectively contribute to online sexual extortion 
being treated as a distinct criminal wrong. In assessing how well existing laws capture these 
harms and the wrongs of online sexual extortion, an evaluation of the criminal law 
framework in Scotland is then undertaken. Although acknowledged that there exist a number 
of offences that a perpetrator may be prosecuted under, it is argued that the response is far 
from satisfactory. This thesis concludes that legislative intervention would fill a gap in the 
current criminal law response. This could be achieved by introducing a discrete offence 
aimed at capturing more serious instances of sexual extortion. This would have important 
benefits in terms of reflecting the severity of the wrongdoing, the broader pattern of control, 
and range of harms experienced. It would additionally help raise awareness and be more 
effective in respect of fair labelling. A suggestion as to what the key elements of such an 
offence should be is offered in the final section of the thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  As we continue to witness technological advancements,1 more opportunities emerge for 
existing offences to be committed in previously unimaginable ways.2 This has led to a 
growing body of research on two categories of criminal wrongdoing where technology is 
used to commit a sexual wrong: ‘image-based sexual abuse’ (IBSA) and ‘technology-
facilitated sexual violence’ (TFSV).3 This research seeks to draw on and add to this literature 
by considering an emerging species of conduct that while falling within the parameters of 
these areas, has received little academic attention: online sexual extortion. Although 
somewhat neglected in terms of research, this does not reflect the severity of this conduct. 
As will be demonstrated in the course of this thesis, this conduct has the potential to cause 
great harm and the effects on victims can be severe. 
   
  As can be inferred from the label given to this conduct, the root of the wrongdoing lies in 
the offence of extortion. Extortion (and its English law counterpart blackmail)4 is regarded 
as a serious crime5 and its origins can be traced back as far as institutional writers including 
Alison6 and Hume.7 While considerable research has been undertaken on extortion and 
blackmail,8 much of this has wrangled with conceptual questions such as the rationales for 
these offences.9 This literature is vast and extends beyond the scope of this research. What 
this research rather seeks to do is examine the specific wrongs involved in online sexual 
extortion. It represents an example of cyber-enabled crime,10 where an existing offence is 
committed in a different way through the use of technology. As the conduct straddles distinct 
criminal law categories including sexual offences, dishonesty offences and cybercrime, this 
                                                          
1 J Clough, Principles of Cybercrime (2015) 5.  
2 E.g. online fraud scams, webcam hacking, online grooming of children through social media and chat sites, 
and cyber-stalking and harassment. See Home Affairs Select Committee: E-crime (2013, 5th Report of the 
Home Affairs Select Committee) HC 70 at 4. 
3 A literature review is set out at 2.1. 
4 These offences are used interchangeably in the literature. However, important differences exist between the 
Scots law offence of extortion and English law offence of blackmail: see below at 3.2.1. 
5 The offence is triable on indictment and can carry a severe sentence. See also P Alldridge, “Attempted 
murder of the soul: blackmail, privacy and secrets” (1983) 13 OJLS 368 at 369.  
6 A Alison, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland (1832) 576-579. 
7 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes (1797) I, 439. 
8 J Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edn (2008) 614. 
9 This has been termed the “blackmail paradox”. For an overview of the vast literature here see D Ormerod 
and K Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th ed (2015) 1070-71.  
10 Or ‘technology-facilitated’ crime. 
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is a complex form of criminality. It is therefore vital that research is undertaken and that 
proposals can be put forward as to how this problem should be addressed. 
   
  This issue will be approached from a substantive criminal law perspective. The primary 
objectives are to consider the specific ways that the conduct (i) violates, and (ii) can be 
targeted by, the criminal law. However, this is a socio-legal issue that cannot be examined 
in a criminal law vacuum. As such, reference will be made throughout to surveys and studies 
into the nature and effects of the conduct, with these helping shape any criminal law 
response. Furthermore, although a number of civil law remedies are available to victims,11 
the civil law’s role is beyond the scope of this research, which only considers the criminal 
law response. 
 
  This research begins by examining what is meant by online sexual extortion. This will be 
done by reference to terminology used in related literature and existing definitions that have 
been adopted. A working definition will be proposed, which will be relied upon in the rest 
of the thesis. The chapter will continue by exploring the different types of behaviour falling 
within its scope. The purpose here is to sketch a picture as to which specific acts may be 
captured by the label ‘online sexual extortion’. While it cannot be claimed that this is 
exhaustive, it will nevertheless provide an overview of the most common examples of the 
conduct, being distilled from reported cases, surveys, and media reports. 
 
  The first aim of the second chapter is to map the problem in Scotland through an 
examination of the literature, and by reference to official crime statistics. This will shed light 
on such issues as awareness and responses to online sexual extortion, while also giving some 
indication as to its prevalence. 
  The focus will then turn to the harms. This section will attempt to answer two of the key 
research questions of this thesis: (i) what are the harms of online sexual extortion and (ii) 
how do these differ from those of traditional extortion? That the conduct is wrongful and 
capable of causing serious harm may appear obvious. However, identifying specific interests 
that this wrongdoing violates is more challenging. This chapter will address this problem by 
                                                          
11 E.g. actions for defamation or breach of privacy. Similarly, regulation of websites and social media 
platforms is another area where the civil law may play a role. 
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firstly assessing the extent to which online sexual extortion differs from sexual extortion in 
an offline context. It will be argued that the presence of the ‘online’ element represents a 
very different form of criminality and that the nature of the harms differs significantly as a 
result. Building on this, each harm will be examined in turn to establish the different ways 
in which victims’ rights may be infringed. This will be done by reference to sexual harm, 
damage to privacy and reputation, and financial harm. 
 
  The third chapter will focus on the operation of substantive criminal law and consider the 
options available when prosecuting online sexual extortion under Scots law. The key 
question driving the research in this chapter is this: how suitable is the legal response to the 
problem? In answering this, the research will examine not only which offences may capture 
relevant conduct, but also assess whether these are suitable responses which adequately 
address harms experienced by victims. 
 
  The final chapter will pull together the research by focusing on how the conduct should be 
addressed under Scots law. It will be argued that improvements must be made to reporting 
procedures to encourage victims to come forward and that, as is the case with other 
cybercrimes, jurisdiction represents a fundamental problem. It will then draw on the 
assessment of the current law presented in the third chapter and propose a legislative solution 
that could better protect victims of online sexual extortion. This will be aimed at more 
effectively capturing this wrongdoing, which is inadequately addressed by Scots criminal 
law at present.
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1 DEFINING ONLINE SEXUAL EXTORTION 
 
  This chapter will lay down the foundations for this thesis by examining three interconnected 
issues. It will begin by considering the significance of terminology in the field of sexual 
wrongs committed online, setting out why this matters. Drawing on existing literature 
including academic articles and empirical studies, it will be argued that the range of 
terminology relating to online sexual extortion is problematic and obscures meaningful 
understanding of the conduct. 
  The second section will consider a central component of this thesis: what is meant by 
‘online sexual extortion’? It is proposed that this should be defined in broad terms and a 
working definition of this will be formulated for the purposes of this thesis. 
  The conduct itself will then be examined. A typology will be formed with the aim of 
identifying different species of conduct present in online sexual extortion cases. This will be 
supported by reference to case law from Scotland and other jurisdictions, as well as studies 
into victims’ experiences. Setting this out will allow for a detailed consideration of the types 
of interests this conduct threatens later in the thesis. 
 
1.1 Terminology  
 
  This chapter aims to address issues concerning terminology. This will be done by 
considering the significance of having clear and consistent terminology, and it will be argued 
that in the particular context of online sexual extortion there is a need for greater consistency 
in the language used. 
 
  The importance of terminology cannot be overstated: “words matter because they shape 
our understanding of the problem, and guide our solutions”.1 In an area where terminology 
is abundant this is particularly the case. A key conclusion of a Europol report into the online 
sexual extortion and coercion of children was the “lack of common language and 
                                                          
1 Subgroup Against the Sexual Exploitation of Children, NGO Group for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, “Semantics or Substance? Towards a shared understanding of terminology referring to the sexual 
abuse and exploitation of children” (Jan 2005). Report available at: www.ecpat.org/wp-
content/uploads/legacy/Semantics%20or%20Substnce.pdf  
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understanding of this phenomenon”.2 This can be attributed to the fact that online sexual 
extortion is not an offence in itself and, as such, “the word is a kind of prosecutorial slang 
for a class of obviously criminal conduct that does not in reality correspond neatly with any 
known criminal offence”.3 This can be seen in the variety of terms used to describe the 
conduct. These include ‘sextortion’, ‘sexual extortion’, ‘sexual blackmail’, ‘webcam 
blackmail’, ‘webcam sex scam’, ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘dating scam’.4 The use of these 
varying terms can cause confusion and lead to unhelpful assumptions being made about the 
nature of online sexual extortion. For example, terms such as ‘webcam blackmail’ and 
‘dating scam’ denote certain modes of perpetration. While references to these terms in the 
media may be in cases where online sexual extortion has occurred, this label can end up 
being lost at the expense of these other terms, which may fail to capture the seriousness or 
nature of harms suffered by the victim. It is imperative that law enforcement agencies and 
public bodies are consistent in their discussion of online sexual extortion so they can work 
together in addressing it. To ensure consistency in this thesis, the term ‘online sexual 
extortion’ will be used rather than narrower terms, which may merely relate to one species 
of this broader category of conduct. 
 
  Inconsistent and conflicting terminology is not confined to online sexual extortion, but is 
an example of a wider, systemic problem with cybercrime. This is exemplified by the 
findings of an Australian government-commissioned report into TFSV, where the lack of 
consistent terminology in describing ‘technology-enabled’ crime was highlighted as a 
central issue.5 This is supported by McGlynn and Rackley who argue in the field of IBSA 
that “terminology frame debates and options for legal redress, as well as playing a vital 
expressive role”.6 In the particular context of TFSV, it has been said that  “existing 
terminology and the laws…do not adequately capture the scope, nature or intersection of 
                                                          
2 Europol, European Cybercrime Centre, Online sexual coercion and extortion as a form of crime affecting 
children - Law Enforcement Perspective (May 2017) at 6. Available at: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/online_sexual_coercion_and_extortion_as_a_fo
rm_of_crime_affecting_children.pdf 
3 B Wittes, C Poplin, Q Jurecic and C Spera, “Sextortion: cybersecurity, teenagers, and remote sexual 
assault” (Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2016) at 10. 
4 Europol, Online Sexual Coercion (n.2) at 9 
5 N Bluett-Boyd, B Fileborn,  A Quadara and S Moore, “The role of emerging communication technologies 
in experiences of sexual violence: a new legal frontier?” (Australian Institute of Family Studies Research 
Report No.23, 2013) at 3. Available at: https://aifs.gov.au/publications/role-emerging-communication-
technologies-experiences-sexual-violenc  
6 C McGlynn and E Rackley, “Image-based sexual abuse” (2017) 37 OJLS 534 at 535 
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such harms”7. This may be because the terminology draws on stereotypical coverage of such 
conduct or fails to reflect the severity of the wrongs. Parallels can be drawn with ‘revenge 
porn’, with the term being popularly used in the wider media despite there being no such 
offence. Recently enacted legislation on this in Scotland refrains from using this term and 
instead provides a much more suitable label: the non-consensual disclosure of intimate 
photographs or films.8 This is much more beneficial in terms of focusing discussion on the 
wrong. 
  Similarly, just as there were concerns that ‘revenge porn’ skewed debates on this conduct, 
focusing on the motive (revenge) and nature of the material (pornography),9 similar fears 
have arisen in respect of online sexual extortion. One problem is that this term (or 
‘sextortion’) places too great an emphasis on the extortion element. There is concern that the 
word ‘extortion’ is inextricably linked with the idea of demands backed by threats of 
violence for the receipt of money or property. This can be attributed primarily to the 
relationship between extortion and property under English law.10 This is one reason why the 
Europol report uses the term ‘coercion’ as well as extortion11 because the conduct “is not 
simple extortion by means of a threat of reputational damage”.12 However, given the breadth 
of extortion under Scots law, this is less of a concern here as there is no requirement for 
violence or financial gain.13 
 
1.2 Defining Online Sexual Extortion 
 
  It is imperative that a clear definition of online sexual extortion is adopted. The primary 
reason is to achieve clarity in the law and in practice.14 A lack of a clear definition can be 
seen as contributing to the neglect of the problem by law enforcement agencies, journalists 
and public bodies.15 
                                                          
7 A Powell and N Henry, “Sexual violence in the digital age: the scope and limits of criminal law” (2016) 25 
Social and Legal Studies 397 at 398 
8 Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s.2. 
9 McGlynn & Rackley (n.6) at 536. 
10 Theft Act 1968 s.34(2). 
11 Europol, Online sexual coercion (n.2)  
12 B Wittes, C Poplin, Q Jurecic and C Spera, “Closing the sextortion sentencing gap: a legislative proposal” 
(Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2016) at 7. 
13 See 3.2.1 
14 In the reform of sexual offences a key aim of the project was to make the law clear: Report on Rape and 
Other Sexual Offences (Scot Law Com No 209, 2007) para 1.24.  
15 Wittes et al (n.3) at 4. 
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  With many types of criminal conduct its exact nature is apparent from how it is labelled. 
One would intuitively think this would be the case with online sexual extortion; however, 
this is not necessarily so. It can manifest itself in a number of forms and much of the activity 
takes place in secrecy. As a result, “it remains relatively undefined”.16 
 
1.2.1 Existing Definitions 
 
  What definitions exist at present?  It will now be shown that a number of definitions have 
been adopted under the label of ‘online sexual extortion’, thereby hindering progress that 
can be made in addressing the problem. This section will consider both the merits and 
shortcomings of using what will be referred to as the ‘narrow definition’ and ‘broad 
definition’ of online sexual extortion, arguing in favour of the latter. The definition adopted 
in this thesis will be important in assessing the criminal law response to this conduct and 
proposing how it can best be addressed in Scotland. 
   
  To begin with, the label implies that there are three, obvious, discrete elements. Firstly, that 
the conduct in question must be committed online. Secondly, that there must be a sexual 
element. And thirdly, that it must involve extortion. The presence of each of these elements 
distinguishes this conduct from offences such as the non-consensual distribution of intimate 
images or extortion itself. As such, neither of these offences alone suitably encapsulate the 
conduct. 
 
  In certain contexts, discussion of online sexual extortion has been narrowly framed around 
cases where the demand is of a sexual nature. This encompasses situations where an 
individual is threatened into doing something sexual. The focus here is the demand of the 
perpetrator. Such a definition captures archetypical cases of ‘webcam blackmail’, where a 
victim is threatened into performing sexual acts on a webcam. It would also include 
situations where a victim is threatened into sending sexual images or material. The Europol 
report is consistent with this and defines the purpose as being to “obtain sexually explicit 
                                                          
16 ibid at 9. 
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material or sexual favours”.17 This definition has been adopted in other works18 and a 
Brookings Institute article similarly defines it as “old-fashioned extortion or blackmail, 
carried out over a computer network, involving some threat…if the victim does not engage 
in some form of further sexual activity”.19 In such instances the harm to the victim would 
not only be the potential violation of their sexual autonomy where they comply. The threat 
itself may pose a violation to their liberty, and additionally to their right to privacy, or 
reputation. Clearly this is a serious wrong; however, it will be argued that online sexual 
extortion extends beyond this specific conduct. 
 
1.2.2 Proposing a Definition 
 
  Firstly, this narrow definition fails to cover cases where the demand is not sexual (e.g. it 
may be financial), but the threat is sexual. There is still a clear violation of an individual’s 
sexual autonomy where a threat is made to further infringe their autonomy, regardless of 
whether this is by demands of a sexual nature, or financial demands.20 In all these situations 
the conduct remains inherently sexual. Narrow definitions do not therefore adequately 
recognise differing modes of perpetration that exist among perpetrators. 
  Secondly, they fail to take account of changing motivations. While an individual may 
initially seek to watch the victim engaging in sexual activity or obtain sexual material, this 
may not be all they set out to do. They may then use this material to issue further demands 
to the victim (e.g. financial) with an accompanying threat to disseminate previously acquired 
content.21 It is clear that such a threat is still a breach of a victim’s sexual autonomy and 
should be included within the scope of online sexual extortion, regardless of the fact that the 
demand is no longer sexual. In recognising the varying demands and motivations of 
perpetrators of online sexual extortion, the Crimes Against Children Research Center’s 
definition is preferable. By defining ‘sextortion’ more broadly as “threats to expose a sexual 
image in order to make a person do something or for other reasons, such as revenge or 
                                                          
17 Europol, Online sexual coercion (n.2) at 15. 
18 E.g. Powell & Henry (n.7) at 407; B Wittes, “Cyber sextortion and international justice” (2017) 48 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 941 at 942, 945. 
19 Wittes et al (n.3) at 11. 
20 See discussion of the sexual harms below at 2.5.1(a). 
21 D Lee, “Teenager’s death sparks cyber-blackmailing probe”, BBC News (16 Aug 2013). Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-23712000   
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humiliation”22 they take account of sexual threats. However, the downsides of such a 
definition are, firstly, that threatening to expose a sexual image for revenge or humiliation 
is a separate criminal wrong that (assuming there is no demand) does not amount to 
extortion, and secondly, that it frames the threatening behaviour in terms of exposing a 
sexual image without appreciating other threats that may be employed. In the UK, even the 
NCA can be accused of skewing perceptions. While not providing a precise definition, they 
nevertheless describe it as conduct through which “criminals might befriend victims online 
by using a fake identity and then persuade them to perform sexual acts in front of their 
webcam”.23 This illustrative statement further misrepresents online sexual extortion by 
emphasising deception. Although this may be present in many cases, the description fails to 
capture different ways that an online relationship may begin and develop. It additionally 
does not take account of online sexual extortion in existing relationships and domestic abuse 
cases. In some instances the victim may be perfectly aware of the identity of the perpetrator 
(whether personally known to them or not) and in other cases the victim may be initially 
willing to perform sexual acts or send intimate images without coercion or deception. 
Discussion of this conduct in such narrow terms diverts attention from other common 
features and places too much attention on particular modes of perpetration. 
 
  In combatting these problems, a broader definition of online sexual extortion is adopted for 
the purposes of this thesis. This adequately covers the many forms that this conduct takes 
and is based on the following observations: 
- that an individual’s sexual autonomy may be violated in many ways; 
- that the perpetrator’s demand is not always sexual in nature; and 
- that deception is a common element, but not essential. 
 
  Drawing on these considerations, online sexual extortion is defined as instances where an 
individual, A, engages in conduct facilitated by a technological device with another 
individual, B, and by means of a threat, demands that B acts in a way that is against their 
will, where either the threat or demand is sexual in nature. 
                                                          
22 J Wolak and D Finkelhor, “Sextortion: findings from a survey of 1,631 victims” (Crimes Against Children 
Research Center, 2016) at 5. Available at: https://www.wearethorn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Sextortion_Report.pdf  
23 NCA information page on “Sextortion”. Available at: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-
do/crime-threats/kidnap-and-extortion/sextortion-webcam-blackmail 
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  This definition ensures that conduct is caught so long as either the threat or demand is 
sexual in nature and also provides that undue emphasis is not placed on one particular mode 
of perpetration. 
 
1.3 Establishing a Typology of Conduct 
 
  In light of what is argued above, there is no consistent pattern of behaviour. Certain 
elements such as fraud and deception may be present in many, but not all, instances. In 
addition to this, continuous technological developments have resulted in a lack of empirical 
research illustrating the ways that technology facilitates sexual violence.24 This further 
complicates the task of identifying species of conduct falling under the heading of online 
sexual extortion. 
  An attempt will nevertheless be made to break down different species of behaviour by 
reference to key features of online sexual extortion cases. This section will seek to examine 
the significance of each of these. It will begin by exploring the presence of consent and 
following this will examine the relevance of the parties’ status, modes of facilitation, and 
lastly, the distinction between preparatory and substantive criminal conduct. As will be 
shown, there are important legal distinctions between the types of conduct discussed and, as 
such, this is a necessary exercise for the purposes of evaluating the criminal law response in 
Chapter 3. 
 
1.3.1 Sexting and Non-Consensual Conduct 
 
  Firstly, it is important to distinguish online sexual extortion from sexting.25 Although 
certain types of conduct may be considered risky26 (e.g. sexting; consensual sharing of 
images), these behaviours on their own are unlikely to be criminal.27 Sexting has been 
defined as “the consensual taking and consensual sharing of semi-nude/nude/explicit images 
                                                          
24 Bluett-Boyd et al (n.5) at 4. 
25 E Quayle, “Over the Internet, under the radar: online child sex abuse and exploitation – a brief literature 
review” (2017) at 3; Wittes et al (n.3) at 3. 
26 In the sense that although they may initially involve the consensual sharing of intimate images or other 
media, this material may later be used in ways they had not consented to. 
27 Except where the sexting is between an adult and child or between two children. 
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with the intended recipient”.28 Thus, the difference between sexting and ‘sextortion’ is that 
sexting is typically consensual. The question of whether an individual therefore notionally 
consented to doing anything sexual will rarely be of significance in the case of the latter; 
consent will likely be negated by the perpetrator’s threats. 
  However, that is not to say that consensual conduct such as sexting may never be relevant 
to online sexual extortion. It frequently features as a preliminary act in situations where the 
victim consensually sends images or other intimate material to an individual who plans, or 
later uses this material, to coerce the victim. Although this does not change the nature of the 
initial sending of material (which remains consensual), it represents a very different wrong. 
  Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next section, where one of the individuals 
participating in sexting is under the age of 16, then regardless of whether there is any factual 
consent, this will still be a criminal wrong, even prior to any coercive acts by the perpetrator. 
 
1.3.2 Status of the Parties 
 
  Secondly, there are differences in the categorisation of the conduct depending on the status 
of the parties. The two main issues here relate, firstly, to the age of the parties, and secondly 
to their relationship. The nature and degree of criminality may vary according to the status 
of the parties involved. 
 
In terms of age there are four possibilities: 
 
(i) A and B are both adults 
(ii) A is an adult and B is a child 
(iii) A and B are both children 
(iv) A is a child and B is an adult29 
                                                          
28 Bluett-Boyd et al (n.5) at 2. 
29 Although no examples of a child engaging in online sexual extortion against an adult have been found in 
the course of this research, it is entirely conceivable that a 15 year old could sexually extort a 16 year old. 
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  Age is a significant consideration. Where the victim is a child then the issue of consent 
differs. The Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 is modelled on the protective principle: 
that sexual activity by a person over the age of 16 with anyone under the age of 16 is 
criminal.30 However, its approach differs depending on the child’s age. Separate offences 
exist where the criminal conduct involves what the legislation terms as ‘older’ (a child who 
has attained the age of 16) and ‘younger’ (a child who has attained the age of 13 but not yet 
attained the age of 16) children. Where a ‘younger child’ is involved, the law does not have 
to engage with the task of showing that consent was absent. The legislation simply 
acknowledges that it is impossible for consent to be given in such circumstances. However, 
where the victim is an older child it will be necessary to consider consent, not in terms of 
assessing if there is criminal liability, but in determining the severity of the offence. The 
practical implication of this is that where factual consent is present, the correct offence with 
which the accused should be charged is that specifically relating to an older child.31 
Recognising this distinction allows for the conduct to be appropriately distinguished, 
resulting in a more focused approach to dealing with the conduct. 
 
  As well as age, whether a pre-existing relationship exists between the parties is relevant. 
There have been found to be “substantial differences in dynamics”32 between this 
relationship, and one that develops online with a stranger. This has consequences both for 
the harms sustained by the victim, and also their ability to report wrongdoing. In terms of 
harm, perpetrators can exercise a greater degree of control over the victim within a pre-
existing relationship. Research has found that in the majority of these cases, the primary 
motivation of the perpetrator is to demand or coerce the victim into returning or remaining 
in a relationship with them.33 It is therefore important to recognise the specific harms that 
may be felt in these cases, as well as noting that such conduct may be part of a wider pattern 
of domestic abuse and result in liability for the recently introduced coercive control 
offence.34 
 
                                                          
30 Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (n.14) para 1.28. 
31 WD v McPherson 2013 SCCR 305. 
32 Wolak & Finkelhor (n.22) at 8. 
33 ibid at 22. 
34 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 s.1; see 3.3.4. 
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1.3.3 Methods of Perpetration  
 
  Thirdly, it must be recognised that online sexual extortion covers a range of conduct and is 
“multivariate in character”.35 Can any patterns be identified? 
   
It is suggested that the conduct may begin from three different factual bases. 
  These are: 
  (i) Where the perpetrator, A, by deception, establishes communication with the 
victim, B, through a website or online application. 
(ii) Where the perpetrator, A, without using deception, establishes communication 
with the victim, B, through a website or online application. 
(iii) Where the perpetrator, A, remotely gains access to either a computer, webcam 
or online account belonging to the victim, B. 
 
  Thus, the perpetrator will either initially engage with the victim by deception, without 
deception, or by remotely accessing a technological device or online account belonging to 
the victim. These modes of establishing contact with victims can be seen in reported cases 
from other jurisdictions and will now be considered. These not only have important 
consequences from a purely legal perspective - they may impact the offences with which the 
perpetrator can be charged - but also from a law enforcement perspective, with the response 
differing according to the mode of perpetration. 
 
1.3.3(a) Deception 
 
  Given the ease with which perpetrators of online offences can deceive victims, it is 
unsurprising that deception features prominently in online sexual extortion cases. In a survey 
of young victims, 55% of respondents in their first interaction with a perpetrator claimed 
                                                          
35 Wittes (n.18) at 943. 
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they were deceived or given a false impression as to their identity or features.36 Lies and 
misrepresentations most commonly related to age, gender or the aggressor’s intentions.37 In 
some instances even the identities of the victims’ partners were assumed as a means of 
deceiving victims.38 Examples of such conduct can be seen in the cases discussed below. 
   
  In the recent English case of R v Knight (Jordan)39 the defendant was convicted of causing 
or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity.40 This involved deception as to the 
defendant’s age by communicating with the victim over Facebook and telling her he was 18 
years old, when he was in fact 20. However, deception has gone further than this. In two 
earlier English decisions victims were deceived by individuals personally known to the 
victim. In R v Devonald,41 the father of the victim’s former girlfriend posed as a young 
female before encouraging the victim to engage in sexual activity, footage of which was then 
used to extort him. Deception as to identity was also a means of coercing the victim in the 
subsequent case of R v Bingham,42 where the defendant assumed multiple identities in order 
to exert control over the victim who was his girlfriend. The numerous means of deceiving 
unsuspecting victims allows individuals to target large numbers of people not previously 
known to them with little threat of them being identified and reported. In the Canadian case 
of R v. Miller43 the defendant engaged in conversations with an estimated 300 girls,44 
frequently lying about his age and gender. The girls were coerced into performing sexual 
acts, sending intimate images, and providing details of other girls for the defendant to 
message. Where they failed to comply the defendant threatened to physically harm the 
victims or expose them to relatives or friends. 
  In the unreported Scottish case of HM Advocate v McBride45 the offending was similar. 
False identities were used to develop relationships with victims. This extended to false social 
media accounts where victims were encouraged to connect with him. On doing this, McBride 
                                                          
36 Wolak & Finkelhor (n.22) at 13. 
37 ibid. 
38 Wittes et al (n.3) at 2. 
39 [2017] EWCA Crim 1940. 
40 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.10(1) 
41 [2008] EWCA Crim 527. 
42 [2013] EWCA Crim 823. 
43 2011 ABPC 354. 
44 ibid at para 3. 
45 HM Advocate v Andrew McBride, sentencing statement published on Judiciary of Scotland website. 
Available at: http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/8/1360/HMA-v-ANDREW-MCBRIDE 
 
 
15 
 
repeatedly threatened to distribute intimate images of the victims unless they complied with 
further demands. 
  Technology provides fertile conditions in which deception can be carried out without going 
to great lengths. Bogus social media accounts can be established by simply creating a false 
email address, which can be easily done without verifying your identity.46 This allows for 
online sexual predators to establish multiple identities on web-based platforms, thus 
equipping them with a strong arsenal with which to carry out online sexual extortion. 
  While these examples illustrate the potential afforded to perpetrators when it comes to 
deceiving victims, deception extends beyond identity, and may concern the intentions of the 
perpetrator. This can be seen in the recent case of Matthew Falder, a serial online sexual 
predator who engaged in online sexual extortion over an eight year period. Falder sought out 
victims and obtained sexual images by posing as a female artist looking for life models 
online, and by posting on advertising sites such as Gumtree.47 This is similar to where 
perpetrators pose as a legitimate person from a casting or modelling agency, or photography 
studio.48 In these cases the material is obtained fraudulently and once the perpetrator 
possesses this they may extort victims for additional material, live sexual acts, physical 
contact, or money. 
 
1.3.3(b) Absence of Deception  
 
  There are instances where the perpetrator uses other techniques in order to establish 
communication with victims. Although not mutually exclusive from deception, these means 
do not require deception. These include techniques such as using disinhibiting conduct, 
positive inducements, and building a rapport. 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 J Clough, Principles of Cybercrime, 2nd edn (2015) 7. For a more detailed discussion of this see 2.4.2(a). 
47 “Matthew Falder posed as female artist for online sex attacks” BBC News (16 Oct 2017). Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-41640079  
48 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) Report (2017) at 38. Available at: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/iocta2017.pdf 
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1.3.3(b)(i) Disinhibiting Conduct 
 
  Perpetrators may target potential victims by using ‘disinhibiting conduct’. An example of 
this is inciting individuals to look at child pornography in order to erode their vulnerability 
and then use this as a means of coercion by threatening to disclose this if they fail to 
comply.49 There are similarities here with tactics used by those engaging in online grooming, 
harassment and cyberstalking. Thus, a common strategy (particularly where the victim is a 
child) appears to be making the victim believe that they themselves are engaging in illegal 
activity. This is not novel, with the threat to report someone of having committed a criminal 
offence being a long-established sub-category of blackmail and extortion.50 However, 
technology has made this much easier and more opportunities exist to incite unsuspecting 
victims into committing offences. In responding to this, efforts have been made to make 
children aware they are not committing any crime where they are coerced online into 
carrying out acts against their wishes. From a Scottish perspective, Police Scotland have 
sought to increase awareness of this and reassure victims that they are not the ones in the 
wrong.51 
 
1.3.3(b)(ii) Positive Inducements 
 
  Although online sexual extortion is frequently characterised by a demand backed by a 
threat, it is also possible that an individual may bribe the victim into satisfying their desires.52 
In these instances the perpetrator’s demand will be accompanied by an inducement or 
promise to do something, rather than a threat. Such inducements may be financial in nature 
or even the promise of a job. On its own, a bare inducement which the victim acts upon will 
not be an example of online sexual extortion due to the absence of a threat. However, 
extortion may occur where the victim is induced by the bribe and the extorter uses what they 
                                                          
49 R O’Connell, “From fixed to mobile Internet: the morphing of criminal activity online”, in M Calder (ed), 
Child Sex Abuse and the Internet: Tackling the New Frontier (2004) 37 at 53. 
50 M Hepworth, Blackmail (1975) 15. The other sub-categories mentioned are blackmail through physical 
threats and blackmail by means of threats to broadcast any discreditable statement. 
51 Police Scotland, “Police Scotland advice to child victims of online extortion” (20 Sep 2013). Available at: 
http://www.scotland.police.uk/whats-happening/news/2013/september/advice-to-child-victims-of-online-
extortion/  
52 A Barak, “Sexual harassment on the Internet” (2005) 23 Social Science Computer Review 77 at 80. 
 
 
17 
 
have obtained to coerce them. Such conduct could therefore feature as a prelude to online 
sexual extortion. 
 
1.3.1(b)(iii) Building Rapport 
 
  Where a perpetrator does not resort to deception or remotely obtain private material relating 
to the victim, they may try to form a bond with the victim and to develop a rapport with 
them. Research into this conduct has found that by enabling prolonged communication 
between perpetrator and victim, the Internet has led to an acceleration in the building of trust 
between both individuals.53 Additionally, rapport in itself may be achieved by use of positive 
inducements or disinhibiting conduct referred to above. 
 
1.3.3(c) Remote Access 
 
  The final distinct mode of perpetration is remotely accessing victim’s devices or online 
accounts (hacking). This enables a perpetrator to obtain personal information relating to the 
victim, or sexual material belonging to them. By doing this, the perpetrator has the potential 
to later carry out online sexual extortion. 
  How might a perpetrator do this? This may be done by webcam hacking where the 
perpetrator, by having control over the victim’s webcam, is able to covertly watch and record 
the acts of the victim. In addition to doing this covertly, the perpetrator may be able to use 
material obtained thereby as a means of coercing the victim into performing sexual acts. 
  Extortion may also involve hijacking an online account, and failing to relinquish control 
until the victim complies with specified demands.54 In the Canadian case of R v Mackie55 the 
defendant accessed the complainant’s Facebook profiles in order to coerce them into sending 
explicit images. This was done by promising to relinquish control of the account in return 
for more images.56 This mode of hacking was used to carry out a sophisticated blackmail 
                                                          
53 M G McGrath and E Case, “Forensic psychiatry and the Internet” (2002) 30 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 81 
at 87. 
54 R v Mackie 2013 ABPC 116 at para 4. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid at para 4. 
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scheme in the English case of R v Egege57 where the defendant hacked the victim’s email 
account and set up fake social media accounts purporting to belong to the victim. They 
contacted the victim’s relatives and friends using these accounts and subsequently threatened 
the victim with the exposure of intimate images and videos they had acquired unless they 
received £300. 
  Although remotely accessing another individual’s technological device or online accounts 
may be a vehicle for online sexual extortion, it is on its own no more than this. In this context 
it can be better viewed as preparatory conduct. Like sexting, it may enable a perpetrator to 
later carry out extortion, but itself falls short of constituting online sexual extortion. It has 
been observed that “unwanted sexual attention in cyberspace usually necessitates direct 
personal verbal communication between a harasser and a victim”58 and this is consistent with 
the definition provided in the previous chapter: that online sexual extortion will involve the 
presence of a demand backed by a threat, which requires communication with the victim. 
 
1.3.4 Substantive vs Preparatory Conduct 
 
  Finally, it is important to consider the conduct itself. It has been shown that there are 
numerous different starting points for this conduct even before a single demand or threat is 
communicated. By separating different species of conduct out, it allows us to better consider 
legal responses to online sexual extortion. 
  In order to avoid conflation of these types of conduct, they have been separated into two 
groups: preparatory conduct and substantive conduct. This distinction will be drawn 
according to the definition of online sexual extortion set out above.  
 
  Preparatory conduct consists of conduct that may be present in online sexual extortion 
cases, but that on its own falls short of constituting online sexual extortion. This includes, 
among others, the following: 
(i) Hacking and computer misuse    
(ii) Fraud 
                                                          
57 [2017] EWCA Crim 2161. 
58 Barak (n.52) at 80. 
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(iii) Indecent communication 
(iv) Threatening behaviour 
(v) Voyeurism 
(vi) Sexual Exposure 
(vii) Grooming 
(viii) Pornography offences 
 
  Substantive conduct, on the other hand, is more characteristic in itself of online sexual 
extortion. This includes the following: 
(i) Extortion 
(ii) Causing the victim to engage in a sexual act    
(iii) Causing the victim to be present during sexual activity 
 
  Clearly, suitable criminal responses to preparatory conduct are important in allowing the 
perpetration of criminal behaviour to be stopped and for intervention to occur at an earlier 
stage, prior to the commission of more serious conduct. 
 
  In summary, this chapter has identified problems with overlapping terminology and 
recommended the use of “online sexual extortion” as a suitable label for the conduct in 
question. While other definitions have been narrower in scope, this thesis has adopted a 
broader one in recognising varying sexual harms suffered by victims. Finally, the conduct 
was examined according to key features of the offending. It was proposed that the conduct 
may be categorised and distinguished according to the age of the parties, the existence of a 
relationship between them, the methods of establishing communication with victims and 
obtaining material with which to extort them, and the distinctions between preparatory and 
substantive conduct. 
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2 MAPPING THE PROBLEM OF ONLINE SEXUAL EXTORTION IN 
SCOTLAND 
 
  This chapter will seek to build on the work in the previous chapter by mapping the problem 
of online sexual extortion in Scotland. This will pave the way for a more detailed evaluation 
of the conduct in the rest of this thesis. This chapter has three clear aims. The first is to 
provide a review of the literature in the field. The second is to examine the presence of online 
sexual extortion as an issue in Scotland and to set out evidence as to its prevalence. The third 
is to identify and examine the wrongs of online sexual extortion. This will involve an 
examination of the different interests that are violated by the conduct. Only by mapping these 
harms can the existing criminal law framework be evaluated. 
  
2.1 Literature Review 
 
2.1.1 Literature on the Law 
 
  The legal literature on online sexual extortion in Scotland is underdeveloped. A survey of 
leading criminal law works has uncovered little to no mention of this conduct. Traditional 
criminal law textbooks focus more on substantive offences1 and generally do not pay 
attention to different modes, or emerging types, of perpetration. This is particularly so where 
there is no discrete offence and where the conduct can be viewed as an amalgam of other 
offences. Criminal law works have nevertheless played an important role in this research 
when evaluating the legal framework, despite not offering much on the specific problem of 
online sexual extortion. 
  However, even in books dealing specifically with cybercrime, the issue receives little 
treatment.2 Much research has focused on online extortion from a corporate perspective and 
                                                          
1 G H Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland: Vol 2, 4th edn, by J Chalmers and F Leverick (2016); D Ormerod 
and K Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th ed, (2015); A P Simester, J R Spencer, F Stark, G R 
Sullivan and G J Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 6th edn (2016).  
2 A Gillespie, Cybercrime: Key Issues and Debates (2015); J Clough, Principles of Cybercrime, 2nd edn 
(2015); D K Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (2014); D Wall (ed), Crime and the Internet (2001); P 
Grabosky, Cybercrime (2016); Y Jewkes (ed), Crime Online (2007); D Wall (ed), Crime and Deviance in 
Cyberspace (2009). 
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the growing trend of cybercriminals and hackers holding companies to ransom in return for 
payment.3 This is an important issue4 but when it comes to private victims “less attention 
has been paid to ‘technology-facilitated sexual violence’, where new technologies are used 
as tools to perpetrate or extend the harm of a sexual assault”.5 
  Despite this, recently there has been a rapid growth of literature in this area, particularly 
from a feminist perspective. Several authors have been influential including Powell, Henry, 
McGlynn, Rackley, Hughton and Citron. In particular, much attention has been devoted to 
McGlynn and Rackley’s conceptualisation of conduct as IBSA, and specifically the well-
publicised issue of the non-consensual distribution of intimate images.6 Much of these works 
have additionally considered grooming, ‘up-skirting’, and cyber-stalking, perhaps as a result 
of greater media and legislative attention. However, less focus has been paid to online sexual 
extortion,7 which remains “remarkably understudied”.8 In the context of IBSA, neglect of 
other species of offending is acknowledged by McGlynn and Rackley, who state that 
“focussing the law and public debate too narrowly around classic 'revenge porn' cases is 
obscuring from public view, and legal redress, other forms of image-based sexual abuse”.9 
Although online sexual extortion extends beyond IBSA,10 this nevertheless shows that a 
change of focus would help in better tracking the scale of the conduct and in identifying 
appropriate legal responses to it. Broader than IBSA is TFSV,11 a concept pioneered 
primarily by Powell and Henry. TFSV is “where mobile and online technologies are used as 
tools to blackmail, control, coerce, harass, humiliate, objectify or violate another person”.12 
This category therefore comprises wrongs extending beyond the misuse of sexual images. 
As a result, online sexual extortion falls within this conceptualisation, despite a similar lack 
of attention being paid to it in terms of research output. One of the leading and most up-to-
date works is Powell and Henry’s Sexual Violence in a Digital Age.13 This covers various 
                                                          
3 See M D Griffiths, “Internet corporate blackmail: a growing problem” (2004) 168 Justice of the Peace 632-
633; S Bremner, Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from Cyberspace (2010) 80-81; Wall, ibid 31-32. 
4 See Gillespie, Cybercrime (n.2) 41-42, where it is stated that hacking remains much more prevalent among 
corporations and governments than individuals.  
5 A Powell and N Henry, “Sexual violence in the digital age: the scope and limits of criminal law” (2016) 25 
Social & Legal Studies 397 at 397. 
6 Colloquially referred to as ‘revenge porn’. 
7 B Wittes, C Poplin, Q Jurecic and C Spera, “Sextortion: cybersecurity, teenagers, and remote sexual 
assault” (Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2016) at 9. 
8 ibid at 6. 
9 C McGlynn and E Rackley, “Image-based sexual abuse: more than just ‘revenge porn’” (2016) Research 
Spotlight Publication at 2. 
10 Although images may be used to extort further sexual material from victims or coerce them into engaging 
in sexual activity, they are not the only means of doing this.  
11 Powell & Henry (n.5) at 398. 
12 ibid. 
13 A Powell and N Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age (2017). 
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types of TSFV (including a brief mention of ‘sextortion’)14 but tackles these issues primarily 
from a feminist perspective and only deals with the experiences of adult victims. As a result, 
it does not engage with issues of substantive criminal law nor address the conceptual nature 
of online sexual extortion. 
  Moreover, framing debates regarding IBSA and TFSV solely in terms of gender and crimes 
against women is problematic. Although generally accepted that these are overwhelmingly 
crimes committed against women,15 media reports and guidance from law enforcement 
bodies have suggested that a large number of men also fall victim to online sexual 
extortion.16 One only needs to look at two of the Scottish examples discussed in this thesis 
to see that men may be targeted.17 It is for this reason that this thesis examines online sexual 
extortion as a wrong against individuals of any gender. 
 
2.1.2 Literature on the Issues 
 
2.1.2(a) Empirical Studies 
 
  Although legal literature on online sexual extortion is lacking, empirical research has been 
carried out on this conduct. Emphasis here is often placed on victim studies, prevention 
techniques, and educational awareness, with little mention of substantive criminal law.18 
Notable examples include surveys of child victims’ experiences19 of online sexual extortion 
and the Australian Institute of Family Studies Research Report into the harms of emerging 
                                                          
14 ibid 122-124. 
15 B Wittes, “Cyber sextortion and international justice” (2017) 48 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
941 at 944. 
16 Police Scotland news bulletin, “Men more likely to fall victim to sextortion” (14 Dec 2016). Available at: 
http://www.scotland.police.uk/whats-happening/news/2016/december/men-more-likely-to-fall-victim-to-
sextortion; See also A Crawford, “British men 'increasingly' targeted by sextortion”, BBC News, (25 May 
2018). Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-44260271/british-men-increasingly-targeted-by-
sextortion?intlink_from_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.co.uk%2Fnews%2Ftopics%2Fcgdz91y340mt%2F
sextortion&link_location=live-reporting-map   
17 J Brown, “Experts warn of rise in internet blackmail as police probe suicide of Daniel Perry”, The 
Independent, (16 Aug 2013). Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/experts-warn-of-rise-
in-internet-blackmail-as-police-probe-suicide-of-daniel-perry-8769748.html; HM Advocate v Andrew 
McBride, sentencing statement published on Judiciary of Scotland website per Lord Turnbull. Available at: 
http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/8/1360/HMA-v-ANDREW-MCBRIDE 
18 See for example J Wolak and D Finkelhor, “Sextortion: findings from a survey of 1,631 victims” (Crimes 
Against Children Research Center, 2016). Available at: https://www.wearethorn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Sextortion_Report.pdf  
19 ibid. 
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technology in wider cases of sexual violence.20 Such research tends to have specific aims, 
while no empirical research has been conducted in the UK on this problem. This leaves a 
gap in terms of knowledge of online sexual extortion practices and the impact on victims, 
which it is suggested could be filled through a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
research respectively. 
 
2.1.2(b) Publicly Commissioned Reports  
 
  Similar issues arise in the context of publicly commissioned reports. The most significant 
research into the problem was published in the Europol report of 2017.21 This addressed a 
number of issues, yet expressly excluded discussion of legislative responses.22 Furthermore, 
the report is limited for the purposes of this research by focusing solely on offending against 
children. Despite this, the report found that the conduct “is heavily understudied”23 and that 
“gaps in the research limit the capacity to develop evidence-based policies and 
interventions”.24 This supports the need for more studies on the issue, while reinforcing one 
of the problems that this research has found: that even among the small amount of literature 
that exists, most works only consider the impact on children.25 
  Even from a UK perspective, research has been limited. Although the Home Office 
undertook a broad review of cybercrime through a series of reports published in 2013, they 
omitted to consider online sexual offences at all, except those committed against children.26 
Likewise, a report produced by the Home Affairs Select Committee acknowledged the 
growing threat of online harms to individuals, but only made reference to certain types of 
                                                          
20 N Bluett-Boyd, B Fileborn,  A Quadara and S Moore, “The role of emerging communication technologies 
in experiences of sexual violence: a new legal frontier?” (Australian Institute of Family Studies Research 
Report No.23, 2013). Available at: https://aifs.gov.au/publications/role-emerging-communication-
technologies-experiences-sexual-violenc  
21 Europol European Cybercrime Centre, Online sexual coercion and extortion as a form of crime affecting 
children - Law Enforcement Perspective (May 2017) at 6. Available at: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/online_sexual_coercion_and_extortion_as_a_fo
rm_of_crime_affecting_children.pdf  
22 ibid at 8. 
23 ibid at 6. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid; Wolak & Finkelhor (n.18); Home Office, Cybercrime: a review of the evidence (Research Report 75), 
Ch 3, Cyber-enabled crimes – sexual offending against children (Oct 2013); Bluett-Boyd et al B Fileborn, 
(n.20); Wittes et al (n.7); K Veli “Sexual extortion of children in cyberspace” (2016) 10 International Journal 
of Cyber Criminology 110. 
26 ibid Home Office.  
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conduct, omitting mention of sexual extortion.27 The Law Commission has recently been 
asked to carry out a review into trolling, harassment and cyberbullying laws in England and 
Wales with a view to developing the UK government’s Digital Charter but it is unclear that 
online sexual extortion will be included within the scope of this project.28 
  In Scotland, government-commissioned research has focused on similar areas and once 
again express reference to online sexual extortion is absent.29 This is even the case in a 
recently published report on cybercrime, which although mentions extortion in an online 
context, states that “[t]here is very little known evidence in relation to extortion as a 
whole”.30 In light of these findings, there is a pressing need for a more comprehensive review 
of the problem in order to determine the scale of it and to identify possible responses. 
 
2.2 Statistical Data 
 
  One problem mentioned above is that identifying instances of online sexual extortion is 
extremely difficult. There is little statistical data. This is characteristic of cybercrime more 
generally with it being difficult to accurately determine its prevalence.31 It is suggested in 
this section that three factors explain why statistics are hard to come by. These are that there 
is no discrete offence of online sexual extortion, under-reporting, and problems with 
recording practices. 
 
2.2.1 Lack of a Discrete Offence 
 
  The primary reason why it is so difficult to specifically map occurrences of online sexual 
extortion in Scotland is that there is no discrete offence of this name (or even sexual 
extortion). This problem is not limited to Scotland; in a US context it has been said that 
                                                          
27 Home Affairs Select Committee: E-crime (2013, 5th Report of the Home Affairs Select Committee) HC 70 
at 27. Reference was made to identity theft, phishing, clickjacking, romance frauds, cyberbullying and 
trolling. 
28 Law Commission press release, “Government asks Law Commission to look at trolling laws” (6 Feb 2018) 
Available at: https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/government-asks-law-commission-to-look-at-trolling-laws/   
29 Scottish Government, Crime and Justice, Cyber-Crime in Scotland: A Review of the Evidence (Mar 2018). 
Available at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00532978.pdf  
30 ibid at 23. 
31 Gillespie, Cybercrime (n.2) 14. 
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“sextortion is not in the uniform crime statistics data. So, as a crime, it sort of doesn’t 
exist”.32 However, although not a specific offence, the conduct is evidently criminal and can 
be prosecuted under a number of offences.33 This makes it difficult to track individual 
instances in Scotland. This was acknowledged in the Europol report, which found there to 
be “shortcomings in the recording of incidents…which creates difficulties in assessing the 
scope of this crime threat.”34 Despite this, an attempt has been made in this chapter to glean 
from recent crime statistics the prevalence of this conduct, albeit that this analysis can only 
paint a very broad and sketchy picture. 
 
2.2.2 Under-Reporting 
 
  Secondly, the very nature of the wrongdoing makes it liable to under-reporting.35 Even 
where there are statistics aimed at measuring instances of this conduct, these may not be 
reliable.36 Such cases often concern victims being made to provide images or perform sexual 
acts that are embarrassing, humiliating or degrading.37 The fear of others discovering what 
has happened may deter victims from reporting. This was reflected in Police Scotland advice 
issued to child victims38 and is an issue characteristic of extortion,39 sexual offences,40 and 
cybercrimes more generally.41 Indeed academics have long recognised that extortion and 
blackmail are offences that are almost impossible for researchers to identify first-hand 
accounts of.42 It is therefore unsurprising that where the conduct relates to all three areas, 
concerns arise as to the accuracy of any recorded figures. 
                                                          
32 Wittes (n.15) at 943 
33 See Ch 3 for an overview of these offences. 
34 Europol, Online sexual coercion (n.21) at 7. 
35 D Wall “Cybercrimes and the Internet”, in Wall, Crime and the Internet 8; Scottish Government, Crime 
and Justice, Recorded Crime in Scotland: Other Sexual Crimes, 2013-14 and 2016-17 (Sep 2017) at 6. 
Available at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00525033.pdf 
36 Gillespie, Cybercrime (n.2) 14. 
37 For a detailed discussion of these harms see below at 2.4-2.5. 
38 Police Scotland, “Police Scotland advice to child victims of online extortion” (20 Sep 2013). Available at: 
http://www.scotland.police.uk/whats-happening/news/2013/september/advice-to-child-victims-of-online-
extortion/ 
39 Scottish Government, Cyber-crime (n.29) at 23. 
40 T Thomas, Reporting and Recording Sexual Offences (2016) 8; S Pegg and A Davies, Sexual Offences: 
Law and Context (2016) 21. 
41 A Day, C Milmo, D Mort et al, “Scotland witnessing “significant” growth in cyber-crime”, The Scotsman, 
(22 Jul 2017). Available at: https://www.scotsman.com/future-scotland/tech/scotland-witnessing-significant-
growth-in-cyber-crime-1-4511044  
42 M Hepworth, Blackmail (1975) 5. 
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  There are also a high number of child victims,43 who may be less likely to report 
wrongdoing. A study into young victims’ experiences of online sexual extortion among a 
group of 18-25 year olds found that only 16% of victims reported incidents to the police.44 
This may be for a number of reasons. Firstly, there may be a greater feeling of shame or 
embarrassment among children and the thought of their parents or the authorities knowing 
what they have gone through could be deeply traumatic.45 Secondly, younger children may 
fail to appreciate the wrong they have suffered or even be aware that an offence has been 
committed.46 Thirdly, further threats may be communicated following the criminal conduct, 
deterring reporting,47 or they may be made to believe that they themselves have committed 
a criminal act.48 
 
2.2.3 Recording Practices 
 
  One further issue is that regardless of how many offences are reported, how they are 
recorded is problematic. There is currently no distinction between offences committed online 
and offline in official statistics.49 Although specific research was commissioned by the 
Scottish Government in respect of certain sexual offences committed online, this is not the 
norm when recording crime in Scotland. For the majority of offences it is not possible to 
determine from official statistics if an offence was committed online.50 This is relevant as 
offences such as extortion and sexual offences can be committed both online and offline. 
Thus, the only measure of cybercrime in official statistics comes from offences that can only 
be committed online. These are primarily offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
However, this is a limited number of offences51 comprising unauthorised access to computer 
material,52 unauthorised access with intent to commit further offences,53 and unauthorised 
                                                          
43 Scottish Government, Other Sexual Crimes (n.35) at 6. 
44 Wolak & Finkelhor (n.18) at 6. 
45 ibid; Europol, Online sexual coercion (n.21) at 14. 
46 ibid Europol. 
47 Bluett-Boyd et al (n.20) at 37. 
48 See 1.3.3(b)(i) 
49 This was confirmed by Police Scotland in response to a Freedom of Information Request. See Day et al 
(n.41). 
50 ibid. 
51 Only 30 incidents under this statute were recorded for the period 2016-17: Scottish Government, Cyber-
crime (n.29) at 8. 
52 Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.1(1). 
53 ibid s.2(1). 
 
 
27 
 
acts with intent to impair the operation of a computer.54 As such, this statute is only really 
relied upon where there are no alternative offences to prosecute under, being described as a 
“stopgap”.55 One is therefore left guessing as to the prevalence of cybercrime in Scotland. 
This is despite the introduction of a “cyber-marker” for offences in April 2016:56 this 
recording system has encountered difficulties and is still being developed and 
implemented.57 The result is a lack of available evidence to help compare cyber and non-
cyber instances of the same offence.58 This is in contrast to England and Wales, where since 
2015 there has been a specific requirement to record online offences separately, as reflected 
in their most recent national crime statistics.59 As a result, Police Scotland lags behind forces 
in England and Wales when dealing with cybercrime, who are better placed to allocate 
resources to growing threats as determined through recorded data. These considerations 
therefore highlight the difficulties in relying on crime statistics when mapping the issue of 
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2.2.4 Evaluation 
 
  However, this is not to say there are no useful statistics. Research was recently 
commissioned by the Scottish government in relation to sexual offences and the impact of 
the Internet. There was found to be a sharp increase in the number of cyber-enabled sexual 
offences, with the findings being published in a report entitled Recorded Crime in Scotland: 
Other Sexual Crimes, 2013-14 and 2016-17.60 
  The report dealt with “other sexual crimes”, a category made up of 41 different offences. 
Despite this, the offences of communicating indecently, causing a person to view sexual 
activity or images, possession of indecent photos of children, sexual activity with older 
children, sexual exposure, public indecency, and voyeurism made up 94% of the offences 
recorded in the 2016-17 time period.61 These are (as shown in the next chapter) the very 
offences likely to capture conduct typically seen in online sexual extortion cases. From 2015-
                                                          
54 ibid s.3(1), (2). 
55 Gillespie, Cybercrime (n.2) 14 citing Home Affairs Select Committee: E-crime (n.27).  
56 Scottish Government, Cyber-crime (n.29) at 65. 
57 ibid at 18. 
58 ibid at 11. 
59 ibid at 19. 
60 Scottish Government, Other Sexual Crimes (n.35).  
61 ibid at 10.  
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16 onwards, this category of “other sexual crimes” has become most prevalent in Scotland, 
overtaking sexual assault.62 This comes against the backdrop that sexual offences are at their 
highest recorded level in this country since 1971 (the earliest point with which direct 
comparisons are possible).63 
  In addition to the growing number of sexual offences being recorded, use of emerging 
technologies and the Internet can be identified as factors in the increase of “other sexual 
crimes”. Many of these offences (e.g. communicating indecently; causing a person to engage 
in sexual activity) can be committed online. The most recent figures show that over half of 
“other sexual crimes” are now cyber-enabled, increasing from 38% in 2013-14 to 51% in 
2016-17.64 These statistics point towards a change in the nature of sexual offending. 
Furthermore, in most cases the perpetrator and victims were strangers with no prior contact 
(online or offline) before the offence itself was committed.65 This again can be explained by 
the use of technology, where physical conduct is not required before a sexual offence is 
committed. 
  What is also interesting are trends relating to extortion and threats. Between 2016-17 there 
was a 9% increase in offences recorded as “other violence” within the over-arching category 
of “non-sexual crimes of violence.”66 The research found this to be the result of significant 
rise in recorded cases of threats and extortion, which rose by 25% from the previous year.67 
This again reflects the growing trend of such offences to be committed online, as the Internet 
has developed into a vehicle through which threats and extortion can easily be 
communicated.68 
 
  On evaluation of these statistics, online criminal sexual activity can be seen as a growing 
problem in Scotland. Although increased recording of certain crimes could be down to 
greater willingness among victims to report, increased offending remains a likely 
                                                          
62 ibid at 6.  
63 Scottish Government, Crime and Justice, Recorded Crime in Scotland, 2017-18 (Sep 2018) at 2. Available 
at: https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/statistics/2018/09/recorded-crime-
scotland-2017-18/documents/recorded-crime-scotland-2017-18/recorded-crime-scotland-2017-
18/govscot%3Adocument/recorded-crime-scotland-2017-18.pdf?forceDownload=true 
64 Scottish Government, Other Sexual Crimes (n.35) at 4. 
65 ibid at 17. 
66 Scottish Government, Crime and Justice, Recorded Crime in Scotland, 2016-17 (Sep 2017) Available at: 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00525033.pdf at 21. 
67 ibid. These are the most recent statistics to include specific figures on extortion and threats. 
68 See below at 2.4.2. 
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explanation.69 That online sexual extortion is a very real threat can be seen from the figures 
analysed above and the following findings. Firstly, sexual offences are at their highest rate 
in Scotland and the most prevalent sub-category is “other sexual crimes”. These offences are 
those that would typically be charged in online sexual extortion cases. Secondly, the growth 
of cyber-enabled crime can be attributed towards this change, and this increase is the result 
of a higher proportion of online offences being reported. This represents a changing pattern 
in the way sexual offenders are operating in Scotland with online offending now being far 
more prevalent. Thirdly, there has been a rise in threats and extortion, which are defining 
elements in these cases. 
  Thus, despite there being no official recorded figures for online sexual extortion, trends can 
be identified from related offences that perpetrators may be charged with. These patterns 
point towards an increasing likelihood that instances of this conduct in Scotland are steadily 
growing. 
 
2.3 Media Reporting 
 
  In mapping online sexual extortion in Scotland, the previous sections have exposed two 
problems. Firstly, limited reference is made to the conduct in existing literature, and 
secondly, for the reasons outlined above, there is a lack of recorded statistics dealing 
specifically with the conduct. Both issues make it difficult to evaluate the scale of the threat 
in Scotland and for law enforcement bodies to suitably address it.70 However, it will be 
shown that media coverage can be of some assistance. 
  The issue was brought to public attention in Scotland through the high-profile reporting of 
the death of 17 year old, Daniel Perry, who took his own life in 2013 after falling victim to 
an online sexual extortion scam. Perry was tricked into creating and uploading explicit 
videos of himself online,71 and was then threatened through Skype that the material would 
                                                          
69 L Campbell and S Cowan, “The relevance of sexual history and vulnerability in the prosecution of sexual 
offences”, in P Duff and P Ferguson (eds), Scottish Criminal Evidence Law: Current Developments and 
Future Trends (2018) 67 at 69. 
70 D Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age (2007) 20. 
71 D Lee, “Teenager’s death sparks cyber-blackmailing probe”, BBC News (16 Aug 2013). Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-23712000  
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be disseminated unless a sum of money was paid to the perpetrator.72 Although a high-profile 
story, this is not an isolated example. Another Scottish case reported in the press is that of 
Andrew McBride who carried out online abuse over a five year period with 42 known 
victims.73 Other local reports have suggested that such conduct has been carried out across 
the jurisdiction, even on a smaller scale. These include advice from Police Scotland 
following offending in Lanarkshire,74 and an article warning of ongoing activity in Angus.75 
Although this activity may not be reflected in literature or official crime statistics,76 media 
coverage and reporting of these cases nevertheless help raise awareness of the issue. These 
allow us to identify patterns and trends in conduct and, as such, are of great benefit in 
identifying possible responses. 
  These examples have, in part, contributed towards the issue recently being publicised in 
the UK media and among law enforcement bodies. The NCA released a video warning 
individuals of the dangers of online sexual extortion.77 Similarly, the BBC reported on the 
issue and interviewed victims just this year.78 This has had the positive impact of increasing 
awareness, particularly among children. However, it is difficult to evaluate the practical 
effect of such campaigns, particularly in light of the above findings relating to the lack of 
statistics and recording of this conduct. 
 
2.4 Exploring the Harms 
 
  This section will examine the harms of online sexual extortion. The purpose here is to 
identify the types of harm caused. This will lay the foundations for the third chapter where 
the criminal law response will be evaluated. 
                                                          
72 A Cramb, “Teenage committed suicide ‘after being blackmailed on Skype’”, Daily Telegraph (15 Aug 
2013). Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10245809/Teenager-commited-suicide-
after-being-blackmailed-on-Skype.html  
73 “Andrew McBride jailed for online sexual blackmail campaign”, BBC News (14 Jan 2015). Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-30814443  
74 Police Scotland news bulletin, “Webcam extortion warning – Lanarkshire” (23 August 2016). Available at: 
http://www.scotland.police.uk/whats-happening/news/2016/august/webcam-extortion-warning-lanarkshire  
75 G Brown, “Sextortion scammers targeting Angus residents in ‘nasty’ con”, The Courier (20 July 2018) 
Available at: https://www.thecourier.co.uk/fp/news/local/angus-mearns/691358/sextortion-scammers-
targetting-angus-residents/ 
76 See 2.2-2.2.3 
77 NCA information page on “Sextortion”. Available at: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-
do/crime-threats/kidnap-and-extortion/sextortion-webcam-blackmail  
78 D Whitworth, “Sextortion: big rise in victims ‘with tens of thousands at risk’”, BBC News (24 May 2018). 
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  The types of harms are varied and manifest themselves in a number of ways. This section 
will begin by charting the development of sexual extortion and show how the Internet and 
technological advancements have changed the nature of this offending. It will be argued that 
as a result of this, online sexual extortion represents a new and very specific type of wrong 
that can be differentiated from sexual extortion. 
  Following this, the focus will turn to the specific harms in assessing which interests online 
sexual extortion violates. The following harms will be addressed: sexual harm, damage to 
privacy and reputation, and financial harm. 
 
2.4.1 Development of Sexual Extortion 
 
  This thesis considers the threat of online sexual extortion as a particular species of harm in 
Scotland. However, why is the focus limited to online conduct? Sexual extortion occurs in a 
number of contexts in the offline world79 and has “taken place as long as people have had 
the power to demand sex from one another on threat of doing each other harm”.80 Recorded 
accounts of sexual blackmail can be traced back as far as the 18th century, becoming 
increasingly prominent in the Victorian era.81 As a result, sexual blackmail has been 
recognised as a subset of blackmail itself.82 Sexual extortion is not limited to instances where 
a sexual act is demanded or where the threat is to sexually assault the victim, but also where 
– regardless of whether the demand is sexual - the threat is to expose something sexual. This 
is consistent with the broad definition of online sexual extortion adopted in Chapter 1. 
  This conduct has historically been seen in the context of sexuality with male victims being 
targeted through threats to expose their sexuality.83 This has been attributed to its recognition 
as a more serious crime during the 20th century.84 Greater attention has been paid in recent 
years in the area of IBSA.85 Sexual extortion in this context may occur where former partners 
                                                          
79 See International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ), Stopping the Abuse of Power Through Sexual 
Exploitation: Naming, Shaming and Ending Sextortion (2012) for examples of this. 
80 Wittes et al (n.7) at 11. 
81 A McLaren, Sexual Blackmail: A Modern History (2002) 3. 
82 Hepworth, Blackmail (n.42) 8, where the author lists “sexual blackmail” as a specific type of blackmail. 
For a detailed treatment of the historical development of sexual blackmail see McLaren ibid. 
83 See McLaren’s statement that “The homosexual man was the classic prey of extortionists” ibid 6. See also 
R v Stone (1989) 11 Cr.App.R.(S.) 176 for an example of this.  
84 P Alldridge, “Attempted murder of the soul: blackmail, privacy and secrets” (1983) 13 OJLS 368 at 383. 
85 See the recent introduction of statutory offences for this conduct: Criminal Courts and Justice Act 2015 
s.33 in England and Wales; Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s.2. 
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threaten to expose sexual images of the victim. However, even beyond these specific 
circumstances, case reports demonstrate that sexual extortion is by no means a new species 
of offending. An example is the English case of R v Hadjou86 from 1989, where the defendant 
filmed consensual sex with the victim and threatened to send copies of this film to her 
employer unless she paid him £2,500. Similarly, sexual photographs were used to extort 
sums of money from victims in both the Scottish case of White v HM Advocate,87 and English 
case of R v Kewell.88 This shows that even before the growth of the Internet and other 
technological advancements sexual extortion occurred and is by no means novel. However, 
what has changed is how this conduct is perpetrated. In light of this, the ways in which 
technological developments have altered this type of offending, along with the impact of 
these developments, will now be considered. 
 
2.4.2 Significance of the Cyber Element  
 
  The development of the Internet and technological devices has enabled sexual offences to 
be perpetrated in a number of ways.89 Technology not only acts as a vehicle through which 
abuse may be carried out, but in itself represents an additional threat to a victim’s personal 
autonomy and liberty.90 This is particularly so in the context of sexual extortion and in this 
section it will be argued that there are sufficient differences in the nature of offending and 
the types of harm to support the need for a discrete examination of online sexual extortion. 
 
  ‘Cybercrime’ was initially conceived of as a discrete category of offences that could be 
committed using a network computer.91 However, as technology progressed and devices 
became more sophisticated, computers - and the Internet - began to be used in different ways. 
As a result, they became a medium by which traditional criminal offences could be 
committed and “given a new lease of life”.92 This led to a divergence in cybercrime treatment 
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89 C McGlynn and E Rackley, “Image-based sexual abuse” (2017) 37 OJLS 534 at 534.  
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91 D Wall, “Criminalising cyberspace: the rise of the Internet as a crime problem”, in Y Jewkes and M Yar 
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between those offences that could be committed only through the use of technological 
devices, and those that could be committed both with and without their use. Cybercrime is 
now viewed as an overarching category including a broad spectrum of criminal conduct.93 
Discussion tends to be structured according to how wrongs are perpetrated. The primary 
distinction widely adopted among academics is between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent 
crimes.94 However, terminology here is overlapping and other works have categorised the 
conduct using the terms “tool cybercrimes”, “target cybercrimes” and “computer-incidental 
cybercrimes”.95 
 
  This leads us to the broader question of why online sexual extortion should be considered 
as a distinct wrong. It has been stated that “‘computer crime’ is not…a precise legal 
category”96 and that no distinction should be drawn between criminal conduct committed 
through the use of a computer, and equivalent conduct occurring without.97 This is because 
the only difference is the medium; other than this “the crime is fundamentally familiar”.98 
However, this is an outdated position. Recognising that an offence is committed online is 
important.99 This is because “it captures the different ways the Internet exacerbates the 
injuries suffered”.100 Furthermore, legislatures and policymakers have faced criticism for 
treating emerging technology as ‘tools’ of abuse, as such an approach can “elide the unique 
ways in which victim survivors experience harms”,101 while having a distinct online label 
better allows law enforcement agencies to monitor the prevalence of online conduct and to 
allocate resources towards tackling cybercrime.102 
 
  Specifically, a number of features of online sexual extortion distinguish it from ‘real world’ 
sexual extortion. This section will draw on some of Clough’s key features of cybercrime103 
and examine how they specifically apply in the context of online sexual extortion. These 
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include: (a) the ease with which the conduct can materialise and develop; (b) the potential 
for anonymity; (c) the scale of the conduct; and (d) the permanence of the harm. 
 
    2.4.2(a) Ease  
 
  One striking difference between online sexual extortion and equivalent offline conduct is 
the ease with which online conduct can take place. It can happen very quickly and requires 
little effort on the part of the perpetrator. This can be attributed to factors such as increased 
literacy and advances in communications technology facilitating extortion.104 A false 
identity (which may previously have taken some effort or even criminal connections to come 
by) can be acquired online in a matter of minutes by creating a false email account.105 When 
coupled with the speed at which images can be uploaded, or messages sent, this provides 
ample opportunity for sexual predators to operate and target vulnerable individuals. It has 
made possible the emergence of the “full-time criminal blackmailer”,106 which would 
previously have been unlikely. 
  Taking this further, it is more than simply the emergence of IT and the worldwide web that 
has allowed sexual extortion to flourish. Social media provides a much easier avenue through 
which to target victims, including WhatsApp, Facebook, Snapchat or any number of 
applications that are routinely used. There are continually new media platforms emerging 
that offer additional opportunities to engage in this conduct (e.g. web-based chat rooms; 
online dating websites) and these multiply avenues through which perpetrators can engage 
in online sexual extortion and target more victims. The implications in terms of privacy are 
striking with these being described as a “veritable treasure trove of personal information”,107 
providing unprecedented means of accessing personal data. Such information is a powerful 
weapon for perpetrators who may be able to use this not only against the victim in extorting 
them, but also to build rapport with them. There is also the possibility of more easily 
communicating (or threatening to communicate) with relatives, parents, friends and 
colleagues. Once again this can be attributed to the growth of social media and the ease of 
accessing personal data online. The thought of a victim knowing that these individuals may 
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become involved in the conduct only adds to their suffering, demonstrating the additional 
harm to victims that technology may facilitate. 
 
    2.4.2(b) Anonymity 
 
  The degree of anonymity that technology offers is another factor that increases the 
likelihood of this conduct being carried out in the ways illustrated in this thesis. Extortion 
and blackmail have always been considered highly secretive offences,108 explaining why 
they are greatly underreported.109 This effect is exaggerated in cyberspace as it “affords 
offenders unprecedented opportunities to disguise and distort their identities”.110 The impact 
is that the criminal law cannot perform its core functions of communicating norms, deterring 
criminals, or remedying harms if those perpetrators cannot be identified.111 
  The relevance of anonymity is twofold. The first relates to the perpetrator. The ability to 
remain anonymous is “empowering”;112 offenders may feel less bound by moral or social 
constraints.113 Anonymity can increase confidence when it comes to sending messages or 
threatening the victim. Perpetrators may also pursue and engage in fantasies that they 
otherwise would not in person. It is for these reasons that technology has been said to be “a 
unique medium for social shaming”.114 
  On the other hand, from the victim’s perspective, individuals appear more likely to 
participate in risky behaviours online than they would offline.115 This has been termed the 
“online disinhibition effect”.116 Face-to-face, a person would be reluctant to allow a stranger 
to see intimate images of them or to engage in sexual activity for the benefit of a stranger; 
in the online environment there is less concern. This has been partially attributed to a greater 
disregard for social norms,117 creating a degree of freedom to do whatever one wants to do.118 
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This is supported by psychiatric research, which has found that the combination of 
anonymity and lack of face-to-face contact “can easily lead to a loss of normal social 
inhibitions and constraints”.119 This results in a greater likelihood of emotional self-
disclosure, especially where such disclosure is contrary to accepted moral norms.120 It is not 
necessarily the disclosure of sexual material that may provide the foundation for extortion. 
The victim may reveal intimate details about themselves relating to their wider sexuality and 
later be coerced through the threatened disclosure of these details. 
  These two aspects of anonymity have been referred to as “benign disinhibition” and “toxic 
disinhibition”.121 Both present real problems and together have the effect of creating more 
confident perpetrators who are willing to go further than they likely would in an offline 
setting, and victims who are more likely to share information and sexual material to the 
benefit of these perpetrators. 
 
    2.4.2(c) Scale and Reach  
 
  Perhaps the most striking feature of digital conduct is its potential scale. Although large-
scale extortion operations may theoretically occur in an offline context, it would be 
extremely difficult to match the scale of online operations. An example can be seen in R v. 
Miller122 where the accused targeted over 300 victims, many of whom were coerced into 
sending sexually explicit images or videos which he threatened to distribute if they did not 
comply with further sexual demands.123 
  Perpetrators also operate across different jurisdictions. The Internet provides the means to 
invade someone’s life from another jurisdiction and “enables diffuse, viral communication 
from one platform to another, and from one individual to another”.124 This would simply not 
be achievable without using technology. Why this is significant? Firstly, technology enables 
perpetrators to cast their net wide, and secondly, it has the potential to frustrate the 
enforcement of laws. With respect to enforcement, three issues arise: identification of the 
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perpetrator, cross-jurisdiction collaboration, and enforcement of the laws.125 It is entirely 
conceivable that perpetrators will target individuals in those jurisdictions where there is less 
chance of them being brought to justice. The ability to target a large number of victims has 
therefore allowed online sexual extortion to become a growing threat. This is partly related 
to the ease with which perpetrators can act. Perpetrators now attempt to contact and draw in 
more victims than before and there really is no limit to the number of individuals that may 
be targeted.126 
 
  However, it is not simply the ability to target victims that is concerning. Outlets exist 
whereby sexual predators can work as part of a network or encourage one another. These 
have been described as “support groups for previously isolated sexual predators, support that 
has the potential to encourage some individuals to act on fantasies that would otherwise 
remain dormant”.127 A driving motivation behind this conduct is for individual members of 
such communities to enhance their status and reputation.128 Such conduct may go beyond 
the publication of material obtained through extortion and victims may be extorted live on 
webcam.129 Existing research has found that “when such materials are considered new or 
rare, they facilitate admission of new members or raise the reputation of the existing ones in 
online groups formed by abusers”.130 An example is in the aforementioned case of Matthew 
Falder. In addition to carrying out online sexual extortion, he circulated material among 
‘hurtcore’ websites where sexual predators, abusers and paedophiles share images of sexual 
abuse or physical harm. This is done in a competitive manner: “total control over victim 
makes the abuser feel psychologically superior and this feeling of superiority might satisfy 
him/her so much that physical sexual abuse becomes needless or undesirable”.131 The 
resultant harm can be severe. There is no real way for the victim to determine who has seen 
their images, where they have been uploaded, and how they have been used. This adds a new 
dimension to the criminality and “the anonymity of the Internet has allowed those with rare 
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or bizarre sexual needs a place to find ‘virtual’ companionship, validation, and possibly an 
outlet for their paraphilias”.132 
 
    2.4.2(d) Permanence  
 
  In terms of permanence, online conduct may involve a more persistent degree of control. 
This has similarly been found to be true of cyberstalking, where technology has provided 
continual access to victims.133 The impact in this context has been increased feelings of fear, 
exposure and vulnerability.134 Additionally, how the conduct is perpetrated online can be 
viewed as an aggravating factor in contrast to other cases of sexual extortion. This is 
considered in an article examining the ways in which technology facilitates sexual violence 
with it being stated that “once something is “out there” on the web it is very difficult to 
remove, with it being said to be impossible to fully remove content from the Internet”.135 In 
one case where sexual photographs of the victim were uploaded to a pornographic website 
they were viewed over 1,000 times before being removed.136 
  The permanence can also be seen by reference to the communication between perpetrator 
and victim: “modern communications provide both immediacy and distance”.137 Although 
demands or threats occurring offline may be regular, it is difficult to envisage how they could 
reach the degree of regularity as through the use of technology. Victims can be targeted 
while at home, at work, and potentially at every point during their day. As a result the 
conduct has been labelled as a form of “sexual slavery”.138 There is little chance of escaping 
the threats and the continuous and unrelenting nature of the harm is illustrated in R v 
Casabolt139 where the defendant tried to extort £2 million from his estranged wife. In doing 
this, he threatened her by stating: “If my terms are not met, I can keep triggering the public 
with information about you for years, whipping them up into a frenzy.”140 This demonstrates 
the potential for long-lasting harm, and for the harms to multiply with every future non-
consensual viewing or dissemination of sexual material belonging to the victim. This shows 
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that technology has not only made it possible for victims to be targeted in a more pervasive 
manner, but that there are now severe “ongoing ramifications for our behaviour in a way that 
would not have previously been possible”.141 This can be seen as one of the greatest 
differences in the nature of harm suffered by victims of online sexual extortion. 
 
2.5 Identifying the Harms 
 
  Having established the ways in which the Internet and technological advances have allowed 
online sexual extortion to develop and why it is distinguishable from extortion in an offline 
context, this section will now consider the nature of the harms themselves. This will be done 
in order to show the following: 
 
(i) that online sexual extortion cannot simply be categorised as one type of offence,  
(ii) that the harms experienced in one case of online sexual extortion may differ from 
those experienced in another, and 
(iii) that this consequently makes it difficult when identifying the most appropriate 
legal responses to the conduct. 
   
  The following harms have been identified and will be addressed in turn: (i) sexual harm, 
(ii) damage to privacy and reputation, and (iii) financial harm. 
 
2.5.1 Sexual Harm 
 
  A constituent component of online sexual extortion is the ‘sexual’ element. Violation of 
sexual autonomy distinguishes this conduct from other types of extortion. This section will 
consider the nature of these harms and assess (i) whether or not online sexual extortion can 
correctly be labelled a ‘sexual offence’ and (ii) the impact of this conclusion. This will be 
done by reference to literature on sexual offences and key underlying principles including 
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sexual autonomy and consent. Green proposes three separate categories of sexual offences 
and reference to these will be helpful in differentiating between the varying types of sexual 
harm.142 These are offences involving the prohibition of one or more type of sexual conduct, 
conduct deemed preparatory of, or conducive to, future sexual wrongs, and conduct 
infringing an aspect of one’s right to sexual autonomy.143 
 
2.5.1(a) What are the Harms? 
 
  Online sexual extortion evidently has the potential to violate one’s sexual autonomy. What 
is meant by sexual autonomy? In their recent reform of sexual offences in Scotland, the SLC 
stated that “autonomy is a complex idea but in the context of legal regulation of sexual 
conduct it involves placing emphasis on a person freely choosing to engage in sexual 
activity”.144 This idea of free will is central to the concept and operates on two levels: that 
an individual should be free to engage in consensual sexual activity unless there is good 
reason prohibiting this, and it should be a recognised wrong where an individual is made to 
participate in sexual activity against their free will.145 These two aspects have been referred 
to respectively as the positive and negative dimension of autonomy.146 The most relevant 
dimension in this context is the negative one. The core sexual wrong in most cases is that an 
individual is made to engage in sexual activity against their free will as a result of a demand 
backed by a threat, or that their sexual autonomy is infringed through failure to comply with 
demands. However, that is not to say that no threat is posed to an individual’s positive sexual 
autonomy. Conduct may have a wider impact to the extent that where an individual is 
coerced using sexual material sent to another in good faith, the threat of sexual extortion 
may deter individuals from expressing their sexual autonomy in a positive manner. 
 
  It is recognised that in some cases even before there is any coercion (or even contact 
between victim and perpetrator), a victim’s sexual autonomy may be violated. An example 
                                                          
142 S Green, “What are the sexual offences?”, in C Flanders and Z Hoskins (eds), The New Philosophy of 
Criminal Law (2016) 57.  
143 ibid at 60. 
144 Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (Scot Law Com No 209, 2007) para 1.25. 
145 ibid. 
146 A Wertheimer, “Consent to sexual relations”, in A Wertheimer and F Miller (eds), The Ethics of Consent: 
Theory and Practice (2009) 195 at 196. 
 
 
41 
 
of this would be where the perpetrator hacks the victim’s webcam and uses this to watch and 
record sexual activity. Although a serious wrong, this falls under Green’s second category 
of sexual offences as “conduct that is presumed to be preparatory of, or conducive to, future 
(illicit) sexual conduct”.147 This section is more concerned with the specific harms involved 
in online sexual extortion, rather than preliminary or incidental breaches of sexual autonomy 
that may occur in the process of committing extortion. 
 
  It has been shown in this thesis that perpetrators employ “non-physical forms of coercion 
online to extort sexual favours from the victim”.148 It must be stressed that the lack of 
physical contact between victim and perpetrator does not lessen the severity of the harm. 
There is concern that where victims yield to sexual activity as a result of coercive power, the 
lack of physical force may make them fear that the activity will be viewed as consensual.149 
This non-consensual sexual conduct still constitutes a serious wrong. What is required is a 
change in entrenched perspectives that sexual abuse or violence necessarily requires physical 
conduct.150 This is because they “invade a deeply personal zone, gaining non-consensually 
that which should only be shared consensually”.151 Such activity should still be referred to 
as ‘sexual violence’ and work continues to be done to “widen narrow definitions, based on 
the idea that violence is a physical manifestation, to include emotional, sexual, financial, 
economic and psychological abuse”.152 One impact of this is that it may help to ensure that 
wider forms of coercion (e.g. extortion) are treated as invalidating consent.153 
  Additionally, in terms of harms, breach of sexual autonomy may cause not only physical 
harm, but also psychological (including humiliation and degradation),154 which in turn 
explains the importance of treating sexual offences committed without physical contact as 
seriously as physical sexual wrongs. In R v Egege the victim was found to have experienced 
anxiety and distress following the hacking and extortion she experienced,155 while one 
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survey of young online sexual extortion victims found that 24% of respondents had to seek 
mental health advice following abuse.156 
 
  Harms vary according to the nature of the wrongful conduct. Where a sexual demand is 
made, consent will likely be vitiated as a result of the threat. Demands broadly fall into two 
categories. The first is where the perpetrator demands through threats that the victim engages 
in sexual activity (either in person or through a technological device). The second is where 
the demand does not involve the victim engaging in live sexual activity for the perpetrator, 
but rather is to supply sexual material relating to the victim or third party. 
  Where faced with a sexual threat, victims may suffer a different type of sexual harm from 
that discussed above. It may, for example, be that the perpetrator has threatened physical 
sexual harm against the victim (or another) unless they comply with their demands. 
However, just as in the case of demands, threats may nevertheless be of a sexual nature 
without involving physical harm. It may be that the perpetrator threatens to expose sexual 
material of the victim or information related to their sexuality. 
 
2.5.1(b) Online Sexual Extortion as a Sexual Offence  
 
  It will be argued that online sexual extortion should be categorised as a sexual offence. Law 
enforcement bodies must not lose sight of the ‘sexual’ wrongs present in such cases. 
Although this may seem an academic point, whether or not an offence can be said to be 
‘sexual’ is significant in practice. There are two aspects to this. The first concerns criminal 
liability and has implications in terms of fair labelling. The second concerns procedural rules 
and notification requirements. 
 
  The starting point is that an individual may only be convicted under the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act 2009 where they commit a sexual wrong. Certain offences in the 2009 Act 
(e.g. rape) are inherently sexual and require no further proof of this, yet others157 require that 
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an element of the wrongful conduct in question be ‘sexual’.158 While this may seem an 
obvious requirement, it is important to stress that this is determined objectively, the test 
being whether “a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances of the case, consider it 
to be sexual”.159 That this is determined objectively is to its benefit. This has the effect that 
where the accused carries out an act without obtaining sexual gratification (such as in purely 
financially motivated cases), but the victim suffers an infringement of their sexual autonomy, 
the act is correctly labelled as ‘sexual’.160 
 
  There are important implications where an individual has specifically been convicted of a 
sexual offence. The most striking is being labelled a ‘sexual offender’. This has the benefit 
of alerting others to both the nature, and degree, of culpability of the convicted individual. 
This can be seen as being of symbolic importance161 in ensuring that the offender is identified 
as having committed a sexual wrong. As will be seen in the third chapter, this may be lost 
where the offender is convicted of an offence such as extortion which fails to reflect this. 
   
  However, recognition of criminal conduct as ‘sexual’ also has practical consequences. In 
terms of disposal, an offender may be made subject to the notification procedure.162 This is 
regulated by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, with Schedule 3 listing those offences which 
can trigger this procedure.163 Although under English law the Schedule provides an 
exhaustive list of offences, in Scotland there is a residual category that includes an offence 
other than that listed in the provision where the court determines “that there was a significant 
sexual aspect to the offender's behaviour in committing the offence".164 This is a striking 
difference between the two jurisdictions. This means that in Scotland, even if an individual 
has not been convicted of a sexual offence, notwithstanding this, they may still be subject to 
the notification requirements. This is significant in terms of online sexual extortion. It allows 
for an individual who is convicted of extortion, where there is a “significant sexual aspect to 
the offender’s behaviour in committing the offence”,165 to  be treated as a sexual offender. 
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The result is that there is less concern where the perpetrator is not convicted of a sexual 
offence, but is convicted of another offence, as some of the same practical outcomes can be 
achieved.166 
  What does this mean in practice? The consequences of being subject to the notification 
requirements were strengthened considerably the 2003 Act167 and there now exists an 
“armoury of special measures developed to register, track, and control actual and potential 
offenders”.168 These are contained in Part 2 of the 2003 Act and apply in Scotland.169 Where 
an offender is over 18 and sentenced to a term of at least 30 months imprisonment then the 
notification requirements are imposed for an indefinite period.170 Full details are beyond the 
scope of this research but can be found in the Part 2 of the Act and also on Police Scotland’s 
webpage on Registered Sex Offender Management.171 
   
  Characterising this as a sexual offence also has procedural implications. These include that 
courts may pass an extended sentence (which is only possible in respect of sexual offences 
tried on indictment),172 the complainer may be treated as a vulnerable witness173 and receive 
special protections at trial,174 and the defence may be prohibited from asking questions 
relating to the character of the complainer175 (including previous sexual conduct).176 
  While these mechanisms may still be available in non-sexual offence cases, again by 
reference to the test of whether there was a “significant sexual aspect" to the offending, this 
is not automatic from the outset of proceedings, would have to be done by application or 
assessed, and would not therefore provide the same guaranteed level of protection as 
complainers in sexual offences cases receive. 
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  It is for these reasons and those related to the labelling and culpability of the accused, that 
show the need for online sexual extortion to be treated as a sexual wrong and for recognition 
to be given to the multiple ways in which the conduct may violate sexual autonomy. 
 
2.5.2 Damage to Privacy and Reputational Harm 
 
  Extortion has the potential to cause great damage to one’s reputation. Although often 
treated academically as a financial offence,177 “in practice many prosecutions concern the 
betrayal or threatened revelation of sexual secrets, so the rationale of the offence may also 
include the protection of certain forms of privacy”.178 
  Given the ways in which online sexual extortion has developed, far more opportunities 
exist to obtain sensitive information than previously, and risks to one’s privacy and 
reputation are consequently greater. Even where the perpetrator’s motive is primarily sexual 
or financial, this still raises the question of whether there is incidental damage to privacy and 
reputation, despite not being the perpetrator’s intention. This section will set out how online 
sexual extortion threatens these interests. 
 
2.5.2(a) Privacy  
 
  Interference with an individual’s private life is a clear wrong recognised in law.179 
However, this is rarely protected by criminal law,180 and is more often regulated by civil 
law181 or through human rights mechanisms.182 Yet at its root, one rationale for an extortion 
offence can be viewed as the protection of one’s privacy. 
  In relation to online sexual extortion, three distinct wrongs are possible. The first is 
unlawful obtaining of private data relating to the victim (e.g. images; videos; information 
regarding sexual behaviour or sexuality; passwords; control of online accounts). As set out 
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earlier, this would occur where the perpetrator either obtains personal data through 
establishing communication or hacking.183 The second wrong is where the victim’s own 
information is used against them. This may be done to - among other things - coerce the 
victim into engaging in sexual acts, providing money, or supplying further personal material. 
It is this activity that is most relevant in terms of online sexual extortion, with this coercion 
being the core wrong of any act of extortion. The third wrong is that the victim’s data may 
be disclosed if they do meet the perpetrator’s demands. For the victim there may 
consequently be three harms experienced: the initial loss of control over their own data, the 
coercive use of that data against them, and the ultimate disclosure of that data. Thus, in 
addition to being characterised as a species of sexual violence, it has also been described as 
a “form of data breach”184 whereby an individual loses control over their data with the result 
that it is used as a means of coercing them into satisfying the perpetrator’s desires. 
 
2.5.2(b) Reputation 
 
  Similarly, while certain reputational harms may be compensated through an action for 
defamation, criminal law generally does little to protect this interest. Extortion can be viewed 
as an exception to this general principle. This is consistent with Hepworth’s threefold 
classification of blackmail, with one category being “where the threat is the revealing to the 
wider public or a select audience potentially damaging information to one’s reputation”.185 
Moreover, technology affords opportunities for reputational harm to be brought about in 
different ways. For example, it is now possible for perpetrators to create sexual images of 
victims by techniques such as photoshopping. This was the subject of R v Breakwell186 where 
the defendant used photoshopped images of the victim as a tool with which to extort real 
sexual images from them. The defendant threatened to publish the photoshopped images 
unless this demand was met.   
  As a necessary component of online sexual extortion is a degree of sexual misconduct, 
there is the potential for the level of harm caused by this conduct to be of a far greater 
magnitude than in other cases. It has been suggested that this is “[b]ecause there are thoughts 
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and behaviors of ours that we believe should be kept secret from others…we are vulnerable 
to exposure of these thoughts and actions (and to blackmail).”187 The damage to one’s 
reputation can therefore be greatly damaging and embarrassing in these cases. 
 
2.5.2(c) ‘Virtual Self’ 
 
  Taking this further, online sexual extortion can have a great impact on an individual’s 
‘virtual self’: an individual’s persona in the digital sphere. This may include an amalgam of 
the following: social media accounts, usernames, passwords, media uploaded online and 
various forms of communication (e.g. posts; tweets; messages; blog entries). Although not 
an interest recognised by law, damage to one’s virtual identity can have far-reaching 
consequences. An example is the now common practice of employers undertaking checks 
on potential and existing employees’ social media profiles.188 Individuals can also face 
challenges in terms of regaining control of social media profiles once they have become 
compromised or in establishing new virtual identities. 
  In terms of privacy, violation of this interest may be a result of a perpetrator having access 
to online accounts containing highly sensitive personal data including photos, messages, and 
contacts. This may be “more penetrating, pervasive and permanent”.189 Thus, it is necessary 
that the law can respond to such severe violations of one’s privacy in an adequate manner. 
 
2.5.3 Financial Harm  
 
  Finally, extortion is commonly regarded as an offence of dishonesty or a financial 
offence.190 The motivation is often financial gain whereby the extorter demands monetary 
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payment on the threat of harm.191 However, there is no requirement for this under Scots 
law192 and while this motive is present in many cases (particularly among organised crime 
groups) this tends not to be offenders’ primary motivation. Although much has been written 
on the financial motivations of criminal behaviour such as sex trafficking,193 little 
consideration has been given to this aspect in respect of online sexual extortion. However, 
this has received some media attention with reports of organised crime groups operating in 
(among other countries) Morocco, the Ivory Coast and the Philippines targeting young men 
in the UK.194 This has been acknowledged by the NCA who view online sexual extortion as 
a low-risk way of overseas criminal groups making money.195 The suicide of Scottish 
teenager, Daniel Perry, highlights the problems of online groups acting from abroad on an 
industrial scale. Following this incident, law enforcement agencies were able to identify and 
dismantle an enterprise in the Philippines. The conduct has been characterised in Asia as 
comprising “complex operations that involve people across cultures and nations working 
together to effectively run a very lucrative business”196 and the organised nature of such 
operations has resulted in them being compared to call-centres.197 This has likewise been 
recognised as an area of great concern across Europe with it being observed that a future 
retail market for child sexual extortion media is a strong possibility.198 For those 
participating in remote sexual extortion from other jurisdictions, this can be viewed as “an 
opportunity for gaining additional revenue”.199 There is a link between the conduct and 
pornography. Where an individual is coerced into performing future sex acts as a means of 
obtaining further intimate images, this must be considered as part of a much larger picture. 
This represents a very different type of offending from that involving people known to the 
victim, such as revenge-motivated sexual extortion by former partners or coercive control. 
  However, that is not to say that financial motivations do not exist among perpetrators acting 
within this jurisdiction and on a much smaller scale. Examples of this can be seen in HM 
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Advocate v Hunter where the perpetrator gained £1,700 from sexual extortion,200 and in R v 
Egege where £300 was demanded from the victim.201 While not necessarily posing the 
greatest threat to victims of online sexual extortion, as with traditional extortion, it is 
important to recognise that financial harm may occur particularly where targeted by overseas 
crime groups.  
 
  To summarise, this chapter has firstly mapped the problem of online sexual extortion in 
Scotland, journeying through literature, statistical data and media coverage. It was found 
that little focus is paid to the issue in the literature, and that under-reporting and difficulties 
in recording the conduct represent significant challenges to assessing the level of the threat. 
Despite this, media coverage has raised awareness amongst law enforcement agencies and 
the wider public, resulting in some promotional campaigns.  
  In terms of harms, it has been shown that the “online” element of the conduct has changed 
how extortion may be perpetrated and that those factors examined above allow this offending 
to be carried out in a far more serious and pervasive manner. This has a severe impact on 
harms. While sexual harm is the most prominent of these and the conduct should be clearly 
categorised as a ‘sexual offence’, we must not lose sight of additional violations of privacy, 
reputation and financial interests.
                                                          
200 HM Advocate v Joshua Hunter, sentencing statement published on Judiciary of Scotland website per Lady 
Scott. Available at: http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/8/2057/HMA-v-Joshua-Hunter  
201 Egege (n.155). 
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3  ASSESSING THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
  As noted earlier, there is no discrete offence of online sexual extortion under Scots law. 
However, as the conduct involves a number of elements of potentially criminal conduct, 
liability may arise in respect of certain existing offences. The first aim of this chapter is to 
set out which offences under Scots law might impose liability. Building on this, the chapter 
will assess the effectiveness of these offences by questioning whether they are appropriate 
to tackle online sexual extortion. It will be argued that while there are a range of offences 
with sufficient breath to impose liability in most circumstances, there are limitations in terms 
of adequately capturing the nature and magnitude of the wrongs. 
  Offences capturing the conduct come from various branches of the criminal law. Most have 
been around much longer than online sexual extortion. Lawmakers could not have envisaged 
that such offences would be dealing with this type of conduct. The lack of a specific offence 
of sexual extortion in any part of the UK means that law enforcement agencies have had to 
use an array of offences in prosecuting perpetrators, including extortion and causing another 
to engage in sexual activity.1 In the US, offences relating to child pornography, computer 
hacking, and stalking have similarly been cited as relevant.2 However, although these 
offences may offer some means of redress, difficulties can arise in convincing prosecutors 
that existing offences can be used in such circumstances.3 This is because the offences may 
not obviously map onto the conduct reported nor the interests harmed. 
  As discussed in the previous chapter, the fact that the criminal conduct and harms 
experienced by victims often straddle different areas of the criminal law makes it more 
difficult to identify adequate responses. This also makes it more challenging to conceptually 
place where online sexual extortion lies in the field of criminal law. This is a recurring issue 
when it comes to online sexual offending more generally and this lack of meaningful 
understanding as to the conceptualisation of the range of behaviours has inhibited the 
development of suitable and effective responses.4 This chapter will address this problem by 
                                                          
1 C McGlynn, E Rackley and R Houghton, “Beyond ‘revenge porn’: the continuum of image-based sexual 
abuse” (2017) 25 Feminist Legal Studies 25 at 35. 
2 B Wittes, C Poplin, Q Jurecic and C Spera, Sextortion: cybersecurity, teenagers, and remote sexual assault 
(Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2016) at 4, 5. 
3 McGlynn et al (n.1) at 35.  
4 N Bluett-Boyd, B Fileborn, A Quadara and S Moore, “The role of emerging communication technologies in 
experiences of sexual violence: a new legal frontier?” (Australian Institute of Family Studies Research 
Report No.23, 2013) at 11. Available at: https://aifs.gov.au/publications/role-emerging-communication-
technologies-experiences-sexual-violenc  
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building on the identification of the harms in Chapter 2 and assessing the offences in terms 
of how well they protect against these specific harms. 
 
  In Scots law there is no formal classification of crimes into groups.5 However, writers 
frequently categorise offences according to the interest they appear to threaten.6 Alldridge 
explains the importance of this: “unless crimes are classified appropriately – that is, unless 
the exact wrong can be identified…it will be impossible to label, to compare, or to sentence 
justifiably”.7 This is supported in a leading Scots criminal law textbook, which remarks that 
“grouping offences into categories assists in articulating what it is about the prohibited 
behaviour that is reprehensible”.8 Why is this relevant? Because how we choose to categorise 
a species of conduct can have consequences in terms of the value the criminal law places on 
an interest. In this context, it is important to be able to identify the interest that the criminal 
law protects in cases of online sexual extortion. Only by doing this can effective responses 
be propounded. It would seem that there are three core interests that it threatens. These are 
sexual autonomy, personal autonomy (specifically privacy and reputation interests), and 
property. The evaluation of the current legal framework will accordingly be undertaken by 
reference to the type of offence being considered. For the purposes of this assessment the 
relevant offences have been grouped into the following categories: sexual offences, 
dishonesty offences, and non-fatal non-sexual offences against the person. Following this, a 
broader evaluation at the end of the chapter will draw on this analysis by identifying 
overarching problems with the existing law and arguing that these must be remedied in order 
to improve the criminal law’s response to online sexual extortion.  
     
3.1 Sexual Offences 
 
  As concluded in the previous chapter, all instances of online sexual extortion must 
necessarily involve – at least to some extent – violation of an individual’s sexual autonomy. 
Sexual offences is therefore the criminal law branch most likely to afford protection to such 
                                                          
5 T Jones and I Taggart, Criminal Law, 7th edn (2018) para 2-28; A M Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, 4th edn 
(2016) para 1.11. 
6 P Ferguson and C McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis, 2nd edn (2014) para 2.1.3 
7 ibid 101 quoting P Alldridge, “The Public, the Private and the Significance of Payments”, in P Alldridge 
and C Brants (eds), Personal Autonomy, the Private Sphere and Criminal Law (2001) 79 at 80. 
8 Ferguson & McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law 101. 
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victims. This section will begin by setting out the structure of sexual offences in Scots law 
before providing an analysis of the ways in which online sexual extortion vitiates consent. 
Following on from this, specific offences will be discussed in order to evaluate how well 
these offences respond to this conduct. 
 
  What is the purpose of sexual offences? Ashworth views this as being “to protect the 
autonomy of individuals in sexual encounters, ensuring that there are criminal prohibitions 
to prevent unwanted sexual interference and to criminalise those who culpably interfere with 
individuals’ sexual autonomy”.9 One would think that recent reform of this area in Scotland 
- resulting in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 200910 – would ensure that this jurisdiction 
is well placed to deal with this type of behaviour. Although there is no specific provision for 
sexual extortion (online or otherwise) in the 2009 Act, there are offences that can be used in 
prosecuting it. These are sexual coercion offences, indecent communication, voyeurism and 
sexual exposure. However, other sexual offences not contained in the 2009 Act such as 
grooming and pornography offences merit some discussion. 
  It will be argued in this section that although existing sexual offences will evidently be 
important in capturing certain cases of online sexual extortion, no single offence truly 
captures the harms experienced by victims, nor sufficiently deals with the potential multitude 
of these harms. 
 
3.1.1 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009   
 
  In assessing how effectively the 2009 Act deals with online sexual extortion, it is firstly 
important to consider the purpose of the sexual offences reform. The Act aims to provide a 
set of codified rules designed to cover a wide range of offending.11 Central to these offences 
is the protection of sexual autonomy.12 The relevant offences are framed around the notion 
of consent and it is the absence of consent which makes the proscribed acts criminal. As a 
                                                          
9 A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law, 7th ed (2013) 338. 
10 See Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (Scot Law Com No 209, 2007) for background to the reform 
of sexual offences in Scotland. 
11 But note the remark in G H Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland: Vol 2, 4th edn, by J Chalmers and F 
Leverick (2016) para 41.01 that the 2009 Act “is not a comprehensive code of all offences related to sexual 
behaviour” (emphasis added). 
12 Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences para 1.25. 
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result, the victim’s lack of consent is part of the actus reus of each offence, with this 
disregard for the victim’s autonomy being the defining element of these offences.13 The 
interaction between the specific consent provisions found in the 2009 Act and online sexual 
extortion will be assessed below, specifically regarding those circumstances where there can 
be no consent. These factual circumstances are contained in section 13 of the Act and it is 
stated that consent is absent in such instances.14 Consent itself is defined in the 2009 Act by 
reference to “free agreement”15 and where a case falls outwith the factual situations in section 
13, the presence of consent is determined by asking whether free agreement was present. It 
will be argued that coercion in the form of extortion will vitiate consent in most online sexual 
extortion cases and that although the provisions in section 13 are relevant, ultimately liability 
for sexual offences under the 2009 Act will arise as there will be no free agreement. 
  Finally, it is worth reiterating that in some cases of online sexual extortion, the question of 
consent will be of less significance as the victim may be a child. However, this is subject to 
the caveat that it may still be necessary to examine consent where the child is an older child 
as this can have an impact in terms of the offence the accused may be charged with.16 
 
3.1.1(a) Consent and Sexual Extortion 
 
There are two specific instances where consent is deemed to be absent that are relevant for 
the purposes of this research. Firstly, where the sexual conduct took place as a result of 
deception on the part of the perpetrator.17 Secondly, where it occurred as a result of threats 
of violence.18 In both instances there can be no consent. The significance of each of these 
negative indicators will now be discussed in turn. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 ibid para 2.18-2.19 for background to sexual offence reform in Scotland. 
14 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 s.13(1). 
15 ibid s.12. 
16 See 1.3.2. 
17 2009 Act s.13(2)(d). 
18 ibid s.13(2)(b). 
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3.1.1.(a)(i) Deception 
 
  In a sexual context, fraudulent behaviour on the part of the perpetrator may result in liability 
for a sexual offence, as the fraudulent act will have the effect of negating consent.19 
However, in terms of the legislation, consent is only deemed to be absent where deception 
is as to the “nature or purpose” of the sexual conduct.20 Beyond this, whether deception by 
the perpetrator negates consent is determined by reference to the definition of consent as 
“free agreement”.21 It will be for the court to find whether this is absent based on the facts. 
  In terms of the operation of the rule under section 13(2)(d), there is no authority. There are, 
however, decisions from other jurisdictions with a similarly worded provision. From these 
decisions, this provision is to be narrowly construed. Where deception in question is as to a 
collateral matter then this will generally not negate consent.22 In one Australian case a rape 
conviction was quashed where the defendant caused a woman to have sexual intercourse 
with him by pretending they were married to one another.23 Likewise, in Clarence it was 
stated by Wills J that “consent obtained by fraud is no consent at all is not true as a general 
proposition either in fact or in law”.24 As a result, fraud will vitiate consent “only in the most 
exceptional cases”.25 
  This issue recently came before the courts in England in two appeal cases concerning the 
equivalent provision in the 2003 Act.26 The first was R v Devonald.27 This was an appeal 
against conviction after the appellant had initially pleaded guilty to the offence of causing a 
person to engage in sexual activity. Following the breakdown of a relationship between the 
appellant’s daughter and her boyfriend, the 37 year old appellant began online 
communications with the boyfriend, assuming the identity of a 20 year old female. These 
communications became sexual and the appellant encouraged the complainer to masturbate 
in front of a webcam. The Crown argued that there was clearly deception in these 
circumstances. Had the complainer known that the 20 year old female he was 
                                                          
19 ibid Act s.13(2)(d). 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid s.12. 
22 R v Papadimitropolous (1957) 98 CLR 249; see also the English case of R v Linekar [1995] 3 All ER 69 for 
a similar approach.  
23 ibid Papadimitropolous. 
24 R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23. 
25 G Syrota, “Rape: when does fraud vitiate consent?” (1995) 25 Western Australian Law Review 334 at 335 
26 2003 Act s.76(2)(a). 
27 [2008] EWCA Crim 527. 
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communicating with was his former girlfriend’s father, he would not have engaged in this 
sexual activity.28 It was therefore the Crown’s position that the appellant’s deception vitiated 
any consent and went to the purpose of the relevant act.29 This was because the complainer 
believed he was consenting to sexual acts for the sexual gratification of a 20 year old female, 
rather than the appellant, whose motivation was to “teach him a lesson” by later exposing 
the recorded acts.30 Thus, although the nature of the activity remained sexual – regardless of 
deception – that the purpose was significantly different was sufficient for the Court of 
Appeal to find there was deception as to the purpose of the sexual act.31 The result was that 
there could not have been consent32 and that the appellant was guilty of causing the 
complainer to engage in sexual activity without consent. 
  However, this decision was later criticised in R v Bingham33 where the Court of Appeal 
reviewed the operation of this provision. The appellant challenged seven convictions for 
causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent. The appeal was based on the 
Crown’s position at trial. The Crown had stated that the appellant’s purpose had been sexual 
gratification, and as such, the appellant argued that assuming the complainer had known this 
was his purpose, there was consequently no deception as to purpose.34 The facts are that the 
appellant had assumed two false identities as a means of making his girlfriend send intimate 
images and carry out penetrative sexual acts over a webcam. Although these facts were not 
in dispute, the appellant maintained that at all times he believed the complainer was 
consenting, but his motive was to teach her “to stand up for herself and say no to people”.35 
The Crown’s position was that the appellant was likely motivated by sexual gratification 
accompanied by a possible “power trip”.36 They argued that the deception went to the 
purpose of the sexual acts under section 76(2)(a), relying on the decision in Devonald.37 The 
defence, on the other hand, sought to rely on the decision in R v Jheeta.38 In this case the 
complainer was deceived by an elaborate fantasy created by her partner, the appellant. After 
receiving death threats the complainer instructed the appellant to inform the police. The 
appellant thereafter posed as police officers and sent the complainer a number of text 
                                                          
28 Devonald at para 3. 
29 ibid at para 6. 
30 ibid at para 3. 
31 ibid at para 9. 
32 2003 Act s.76(2)(a). 
33 [2013] EWCA Crim 823.  
34 ibid at para 17. 
35 ibid at para 6. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid at para 9. 
38 [2007] EWCA Crim 1699. 
 
 
56 
 
messages. These pressured the complainer into maintaining a sexual relationship with the 
appellant and she continued to engage in sexual activity. The appellant’s original conviction 
was quashed on appeal. It was held that the complainer had not been deceived as to the 
“nature or purpose” of the sexual intercourse, but rather was “deceived as to the situation 
she found herself in”.39 The court in Bingham was more persuaded by the reasoning in 
Jheeta. They found that the complainer in Bingham had knowledge of what she was being 
instructed to do; by performing sexual acts in front of a webcam she must have known that 
the motive of the appellant was, at least to some extent, sexual gratification.40 Thus, although 
the court acknowledged the unpleasant nature of the deception, they nevertheless held that 
it did not go to the purpose of the sexual activity itself, but rather to the circumstances 
surrounding the activity.41 
  This decision must also be considered in the context of the statutory provision itself. Where 
a provision provides a conclusive presumption that consent is absent (or is simply indicative 
of a lack of consent) then this must be narrowly construed on the basis that it has the effect 
of restricting a defendant’s ability to present a defence.42 Furthermore, there is still the 
possibility of the general consent rule43 (free agreement) being engaged by the jury.44 This 
was confirmed in Bingham where the judge criticised the Crown’s reliance on the conclusive 
presumption and stated “[i]f the complainant only complied because she was being 
blackmailed, the prosecution might argue forcefully she did not agree by choice”.45 The 
Crown, in relying solely on section 76, failed to lead evidence on the more general question 
of whether there was free agreement between the parties. Had they done this then a 
conviction might have been secured. 
  It is therefore likely in light of the case law that the conclusive presumption in section 
13(2)(d) in Scots law would be applied restrictively. The relevance for online sexual 
extortion cases is that there would have to be deception as to the nature or purpose of the 
sexual act in question; mere deception as to personal characteristics or identity will not be 
sufficient for the purposes of section 13(2)(d).46 As a number of online sexual extortion cases 
                                                          
39 ibid at para 28 per Sir Igor Judge.  
40 Bingham at para 22. 
41 ibid at para 21. 
42 ibid at para 23. See also P Rook and R Ward, Rook & Ward on Sexual Offences: Law and Practice, 5th ed 
(2016) para 1.313. 
43 2003 Act s.74. For the equivalent provision under Scots law see: 2009 Act s.12. 
44 Gordon, Criminal Law para 38.10; Rook & Ward, Sexual Offences para 1.319. 
45 Bingham at para 24 per Hallett LJ. 
46 Except where the deception is as to the identity of an individual personally known to the complainer. See 
2009 Act s.13(2)(d). 
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are more in line with the facts in Bingham, it is less likely that section 13(2)(d) would be 
engaged. In the majority of cases the victims will not be deceived as to the nature or purpose 
of a sexual act and will likely share the perpetrator’s purpose of sexual gratification. 
However, it is possible that where the perpetrator has an altogether different purpose that the 
provision may become relevant. In all other cases, the question would be whether there was 
free agreement. 
 
3.1.1(a)(ii) Violence and Threats of Violence 
 
  The other situation relevant to online sexual extortion where consent is deemed absent is 
where the victim submits to sexual activity by reason of threats of violence made against 
themselves or another individual.47 The key question here is one of causation: there must be 
a causal link between threats against the victim and the agreement or submission to the 
sexual conduct in question.48 This requirement may make securing a conviction difficult.49 
Causation may be harder to establish where the victim has had no physical contact with the 
perpetrator. Furthermore, this specific provision is limited as it only covers threats of 
violence and not those cases where the threat is the exposure of sexual material. It would, 
however, ensure that cases such as those referred to in the previous chapter where the threat 
is of sexual harm would be included, assuming this threat caused the victim’s agreement or 
submission to the sexual conduct. Despite this, as with deception, in most cases the issue of 
consent will fall to be determined according to the general consent definition.50 
  
  To put the consent provisions in context, it is necessary to consider briefly some of the 
relevant sexual offences found in the 2009 Act and to assess their suitability in capturing 
instances of online sexual extortion. 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 2009 Act s.13(2)(b). 
48 Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (n.10) para 2.66ff 
49 Gordon, Criminal Law para 38.08. 
50 2009 Act s.12. 
 
 
58 
 
3.1.1(b) Sexual Coercion  
 
  One of the most obvious offences in the 2009 Act that captures online sexual extortion is 
sexual coercion.51 This makes it an offence for a person, A, to intentionally cause another 
person, B, to participate in sexual activity where the following two conditions are met: that 
B does not consent to participate in the sexual activity and where A has no reasonable belief 
that B consents to participating in that activity.52 It is also necessary to prove that the accused 
acted for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification, or to humiliate, distress or alarm the 
victim.53 
  Despite the name of the offence, there is no requirement of ‘coercion’ in a physical sense. 
The offence is instead based around the victim’s lack of consent. As such, the SLC states 
that the offence is broad and can be committed in a number of ways.54 The offence seeks to 
expressly criminalise conduct where the perpetrator causes the victim to engage in sexual 
conduct that may not physically involve the perpetrator. This could be conduct that would 
not fall within the scope of sexual assault. The offence really turns on the question of what 
is meant by ‘causing’? A discussion of the equivalent English offence55 suggests that this 
could be either by “explicit or implicit threats, or by use of a position of authority or 
dominance (simply by speaking words)”.56 Where an individual engages in sexual activity 
that they otherwise would not have without the use of coercion or threats then liability would 
arise in respect of this offence. 
  In addition to the offence of causing an individual to participate in sexual activity under 
section 4, there are also two related ‘coercion offences’: causing an individual to be present 
during sexual activity,57 or to look at a sexual image.58 The rationale for both offences 
appears the same: i.e. that being forced to watch sexual activity or to view sexual activity is 
just as much a violation of sexual autonomy as being forced to participate in sexual activity.59 
 
                                                          
51 ibid s.4. 
52 ibid s.4(1). 
53 Ferguson & McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law (n.6) para 11.5.1.  
54 Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (n.10) para 3.48. 
55 2003 Act s.4. 
56 Ashworth and Horder, Principles (n.9) 353. 
57 2009 Act s.5(1). 
58 ibid s.6(1). 
59 Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (n.10) para 3.55. 
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  These offences have the benefit of reflecting the violation of a victim’s sexual autonomy. 
The primary offence of causing an individual to engage in sexual activity suitably and clearly 
labels one aspect of wrongdoing in online sexual extortion cases: where a victim’s will is 
overcome as a result of coercion or threats and they are consequently made to engage in 
sexual activity without giving valid consent. However, this is just one element of online 
sexual extortion. The offence does not capture additional harms a victim may suffer, 
including damage to privacy, reputation and economic interests. Nor does the offence 
necessarily capture the continuous and prolonged coercion that an individual may have to 
endure. It simply recognises and addresses the wrong at the moment the victim engages in 
sexual activity60 without consent. The wrongdoing in many online sexual extortion cases is 
much broader than this and ought to be reflected in terms of the criminal liability imposed. 
 
3.1.1(c) Indecent Communication 
 
  Another offence that would capture conduct in online sexual extortion cases is that of 
indecent communication.61 As will be discussed below, other communications offences 
aimed at tackling threatening and abusive behaviour may also be relevant when it comes to 
online sexual extortion. However, this offence specifically applies where the communication 
is sexual62 and is sent or directed to the victim without their consent.63 The mens rea is that 
the communication was directed with the intention of either obtaining sexual gratification,64 
or humiliating, distressing or alarming the victim,65 and there was no reasonable belief that 
the victim consented.66 This applies both to written and verbal sexual communications that 
are sent or directed by whatever means.67 There are equivalent provisions that apply where 
the perpetrator causes an individual to see or hear (rather than sends or directs) a written or 
verbal sexual communication.68  
 
                                                          
60 Or in the case of the related offences is present during sexual activity or views a sexual image 
61 2009 Act s.7(1). 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid s.7(1)(a). 
64 ibid s.7(3)(a). 
65 ibid s.7(3)(b). 
66 ibid s.7(1)(b). 
67 ibid s.7(1). 
68 ibid s.7(2). 
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  What are the rationales for these offences? As with a number of other offences in Part 1 of 
the 2009 Act, the victim’s lack of consent is a core element of the offences and forms part 
of the actus reus. Thus, there can be no indecent communication unless the victim does not 
consent to the communication in question. 
  There are two ways in which the offence may be committed in an online sexual extortion 
case. Firstly, where the victim simply does not consent to communication in question. An 
example of this can be seen in Kidd v McGowan69 where the accused pled guilty to this 
offence after threatening to rape two individuals. 
  Secondly, where the victim is deceived and this deception makes the communications non-
consensual. This may where the perpetrator deceives the victim as to their identity or 
personal characteristics. In such cases it may be that there is no free agreement and that 
liability would therefore arise for indecent communication. 
  As discussed in the first chapter, it may be that the perpetrator and victim initially engage 
in consensual ‘sexting’ prior to any extortion or coercion on the part of the perpetrator. 
However, the mere fact that the motive at the time was either to receive sexual material 
belonging to the victim in order to later use against them, or was entirely innocent and the 
extortion was only thought of later, does not impact on this conduct. If the materials were 
acquired consensually at the time then there can be no liability for indecent communication.  
 
3.1.1(d) Voyeurism  
 
  Voyeurism criminalises the viewing of another individual engaging in a private act without 
that individual’s consent.70 The mens rea is the intentional viewing with the purpose of 
obtaining sexual gratification or causing humiliation, distress or alarm to the victim.71 A 
private act is defined as being one which in the circumstances would reasonably be expected 
to provide privacy.72 Additionally, the complainer’s genitals, buttocks or breasts must be 
either exposed or covered with underwear, or they must be engaging in a sexual act “that is 
not of the kind ordinarily done in public”.73 The legislation further provides that the offence 
                                                          
69 [2012] HCJAC 163. 
70 2009 Act s.9. 
71 ibid s.9(6). 
72 ibid s.10(1). 
73 ibid. 
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can be committed electronically and by use of recording equipment or a webcam,74 thereby 
encompassing online wrongdoing. 
  Voyeurism may therefore capture conduct at early stages, where the perpetrator is watching 
their victim without consent, and specifically where a perpetrator remotely accesses their 
victim’s technological devices. However, it fails to really get to grips with the more serious 
elements of online sexual extortion, particularly the coercive or threatening nature of it. It is 
nevertheless an important offence in tackling what may be considered more as preparatory 
conduct. 
 
3.1.1(e) Sexual Exposure 
 
  The final relevant offence under the 2009 Act – and somewhat related to the preceding 
discussion on indecent communication – is sexual exposure. For the purposes of this offence, 
‘exposure’ means intentional exposure of “genitals in a sexual manner”75 without the consent 
of the victim.76 This must be done for the purposes of either obtaining sexual gratification77 
or humiliating, distressing or alarming the victim,78 and without reasonable belief that the 
victim consents.79  
  As with voyeurism, liability for sexual exposure is only likely to arise in respect of 
preparatory conduct in online sexual extortion cases. However, in accordance with the 
typology set out in the first chapter, it may be that the perpetrator commits this offence in 
order to either build rapport with or disinhibit the victim, or in the hope that the victim may 
reciprocate this conduct. In the event of the latter, this may be to obtain sexual material of 
the victim which can then be used as a means of extortion.  
 
 
 
                                                          
74 ibid s.9(3), (4), (4A), (4B), (5)(a). 
75 ibid s.8(1). 
76 ibid s.8(1)(a). 
77 ibid s.8(2)(a). 
78 ibid s.8(2)(b). 
79 ibid s.8(1)(b). 
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3.1.2 Other Sexual Offences  
 
  There are other sexual offences that are not contained in the 2009 Act and liability may 
arise in respect of these offences in cases of online sexual extortion. These are grooming, 
and pornography offences. 
 
3.1.2(a) Grooming 
 
  Provision for grooming is found in the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual 
Offences (Scotland) Act 200580 and the primary offence is that of meeting a child following 
certain preliminary contact.81 The rationale for such an offence was to allow for early 
intervention by police officers to prevent the escalation of sexual conduct by sexual 
offenders.82 As with the introduction of such an offence in England,83 this can be viewed as 
a response to the grooming of children through electronic communications. Notwithstanding 
that this offence seeks to target preparatory conduct84 – there is no requirement of actual 
sexual abuse of children for liability to arise – the offence is severe with a maximum sentence 
of up to as much as 10 years’ imprisonment on indictment.85   
  For liability to arise the first requirement is that a person, A, intentionally meets B, travels 
in any part of the world with the intention of meeting B, or makes arrangements in any part 
of the world to meet B,86 with the intention of engaging in unlawful sexual activity involving 
B or in the presence of B, during or after the meeting and in any part of the world.87 The 
second requirement is that B is aged under 1688 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 
aged 16 or over.89 
  In terms of suitably capturing instances of online sexual extortion, this offence has several 
limitations. Firstly, it is only relevant in cases where the victim is under the age of 16. 
                                                          
80 Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005. 
81 ibid s.1. 
82 Gordon, Criminal Law para 41.25. 
83 2003 Act s.15. 
84 S Pegg and A Davies, Sexual Offences: Law and Context (2016) 90. 
85 2005 Act s.4. 
86 ibid s.1(a). 
87 ibid s.1(b). 
88 ibid s.1(c)(i). 
89 ibid s.1(d). 
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  Secondly, the offence additionally requires that the perpetrator must have met or 
communicated with the victim on at least one earlier occasion. This means that it will not 
apply to remote access cases, but only to instances where the perpetrator has communicated 
with the victim and developed a relationship. It may also be that owing to this requirement, 
the offence would be more likely to apply to those cases where there is a pre-existing 
relationship between the parties with this providing opportunity for such conduct to occur. 
  The third limitation is that it must be proved that the person communicating with the child 
only did so with the intention of meeting them in person. In ‘purely cyber’ cases where the 
perpetrator is engaging solely in online abuse, it is unlikely that they will possess this 
intention. Without this intention no liability for this offence will arise. 
  However, the term ‘blackmail grooming’90 has been used in respect of conduct where child 
victims have been coerced into meeting perpetrators. An example of this in one Scottish case 
of online sexual extortion where the accused booked a hotel room and this formed part of 
his demand that he would only delete sexual images of the victim if she met him there and 
engaged in sexual activity.91 
  As a result, grooming is only of relevance where the offender plans to move from the online 
sphere to the physical world,92 but this may capture some cases of online sexual extortion 
where part of the perpetrator’s demand includes meeting in person for the purposes of sexual 
activity. 
 
3.1.2(b) Pornography Offences 
 
  Online sexual extortion can be viewed in some situations as a means of creating 
pornographic material93 and this may be the wider motive of the perpetrator in engaging in 
extortion.94 As with grooming, for liability to arise the victim must be a child (or at the very 
least that there will be some involvement of a child). 
                                                          
90 Bluett-Boyd et al (n.4) at 32. 
91HM Advocate v Andrew McBride, sentencing statement published on Judiciary of Scotland website per Lord 
Turnbull. Available at: http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/8/1360/HMA-v-ANDREW-MCBRIDE. 
92 K Veli, “Sexual extortion of children in cyberspace” (2016) 10 International Journal of Cyber Criminology 
110 at 112. 
93 See 2.5.3. 
94 Europol European Cybercrime Centre, Online sexual coercion and extortion as a form of crime affecting 
children - Law Enforcement Perspective (May 2017) at 11. Available at: 
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  The Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 criminalises a number of different activities 
relating to indecent photographs of children.95 A child is defined for these purposes as 
someone under the age of 18,96 subject to the exceptions contained in section 52B of the 
same Act relating to images of 16 and 17 year olds.97 This goes some way in attempting to 
protect young people who may be vulnerable to targeted online sexual offending. It is 
additionally necessary that there is a photograph, the definition of which includes a film98 
(or any form of video-recording).99 The main conduct that the legislation criminalises is the 
possession of indecent images of children,100 as well as the taking,101 distribution,102 
showing,103 and publication104 of such images. 
  This legislation is useful where a child is coerced into creating sexual material, or where 
the perpetrator carries through with threats to show, distribute or publish this material. 
However, these offences are limited to these circumstances and although very serious, fail 
to capture additional wrongs present in online sexual extortion cases such as the prolonged 
control and sexual coercion of a child victim. 
 
3.2 Offences of Dishonesty 
 
  As set out earlier, a core element of online sexual extortion is often the deception and 
dishonesty employed by perpetrators in establishing contact with potential victims. It is 
likely that  the offences of extortion or fraud may be committed in these circumstances. 
 
 
                                                          
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/online_sexual_coercion_and_extortion_as_a_fo
rm_of_crime_affecting_children.pdf 
95 Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 s.52. 
96 ibid s.52(2). 
97 ibid s.52B. The main exception is where the photograph is of a child aged 16 or over and that child is either 
married, in a civil partnership, or in an established relationship with the accused, and consented to the 
photograph being taken or made.  
98 ibid s.52(8)(a). 
99 ibid s.52(8)(d).  
100 ibid s.52A(1). There is a separate offence of possessing an image with a view to it being distributed or 
shown to others (s.52(1)(c)). 
101 ibid s.52(1)(a). 
102 ibid s.52(1)(b). 
103 ibid. 
104 ibid s.52(1)(d). 
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3.2.1 Extortion 
 
  An assessment of offences capturing online sexual extortion must include discussion of one 
of the conduct’s fundamental elements: extortion. Liability for extortion will arise where the 
perpetrator goes beyond mere deception or coercion and has progressed to a demand backed 
by a threat. 
  In Scots law extortion is defined as being “the crime of obtaining money or any other 
advantage by threats, often known in non-technical language as blackmail”.105 This is of 
greater utility than the related English law offence of blackmail. This is because extortion 
under Scots law does not seek to restrict the nature of the demand issued by the perpetrator. 
This stems from the writings of Hume who wrote that extortion may occur where there is a 
threat against an individual “unless something shall be done, or shall be desisted from”,106 
without limiting this demand to the payment of money. This is in contrast to blackmail, 
where there must be a demand relating to a gain of money or other property, or for there to 
be a loss to the victim of money or other property.107 While blackmail is therefore commonly 
viewed as an offence against property,108 extortion can be categorised more as an offence of 
dishonesty, or in some instances as an offence against the person given its potential to restrict 
one’s liberty.109 
  Extortion can consequently take a number of forms. As a result, much has been written on 
its basis and justification in the criminal law. Much of the justification is based on the 
coercive effect on the victim, whose liberty is restricted by demands and corresponding 
threats. This is regardless of whether the threat or demand is legitimate.110 An example of 
this was in Rae v Donnelly111 where the demand was that the victim acted in a certain way 
(in this instance that they dropped a case of unfair dismissal against the perpetrator’s 
company) and the threat was the exposure of an extra-marital affair. Thus, the parameters of 
                                                          
105 Gordon, Criminal Law para 28.01. 
106 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes (1797) I, 439. 
107 Theft Act 1968, s.34(2) (“‘gain’ or ‘loss’ are to be construed as extending only to gain or loss in money or 
other property but as extending to any such gain or loss whether temporary or permanent”). 
108 D Ormerod and K Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th ed (2015) 1067; Horder, Principles (n.9) 
409. 
109 Gordon, Criminal Law para 28.01, citing P H Robinson, Criminal Law (1997) para.14.5 
110 There is no requirement under Scots law that the threat or demand be wrongful. This has created what has 
been termed as the “blackmail paradox”. The literature on this is vast. See: Ormerod & Laird, Criminal Law 
(n.108) 1070-71 for an overview.  
111 1982 SCCR 148. 
 
 
66 
 
the offence are very wide. In Black v Carmichael,112 Lord Justice-General Hope asserted 
that “it is extortion to seek by such means to obtain money or some other advantage to which 
the accused has no right at all”.113 It is submitted that the phrase “some other advantage” 
would be sufficiently broad so as to cover sexual gratification, despite there being no 
authority on this point.114 However, in some cases it may not be clear what advantage the 
perpetrator will be gaining. An example would be where the perpetrator demands that the 
victim performs a live sexual act under the threat of exposing a prior video of them engaging 
in such an act. If the perpetrator is not receiving sexual gratification then is there a 
recognisable gain? As such it may be more appropriate to turn our attention towards the loss 
(if any) sustained by the victim. It is clear that a gain is not necessarily required for liability 
to arise. Where the victim suffers a loss, this may fall within the scope of extortion. It was 
stated in Silverstein v HM Advocate115 that “[w]here the pressure consists in creating in the 
victim fear that, unless he yields, his position will be altered for the worse, it is criminal 
unless the pressure sought to be exerted is recognised by the law as legitimate”.116 Although 
the loss may not be patrimonial, the victim will have suffered a violation to their sexual 
autonomy. This violation will be clear if, for example, they are ordered to perform a sexual 
act under the looming threat of their privacy and autonomy being further infringed by the 
possible dissemination of images or video recordings of them. 
  As expressed in the previous chapter, the key is that offences used in response to online 
sexual extortion recognise the breach of sexual autonomy suffered by victims. This is 
irrespective of whether the breach is from being coerced into participating in sexual acts or 
activity, or whether it is through threats to reveal sexual material relating to the victim. 
Although a very serious offence, what extortion lacks in cases resulting in violation of one’s 
sexual autonomy is to send a message regarding the nature of the wrong committed by the 
perpetrator against the victim. This is to some extent linked to the issue of labelling. It is not 
to say that extortion is not regarded a sufficiently serious offence (for it is). However, it fails 
to convey both the culpability of the offender (who may have caused long-lasting and 
permanent physical or psychological harm to their victim) or the nature of harm suffered by 
the victim, who may have experienced a serious violation of their sexual autonomy. 
                                                          
112 1992 SLT 897. 
113 ibid per Lord Justice-General Hope at 900. 
114 It is nevertheless stated in Gordon, Criminal Law para 28.04 that “it would accordingly be extortion for A 
to induce a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by threatening her that unless she did so he would tell 
her husband of her adultery with B”. 
115 1949 JC 160. 
116 ibid per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson at 163. 
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3.2.2 Fraud  
 
  As noted earlier, many online sexual extortion cases involve an element of deceit. In these 
instances it is likely that the perpetrator will have committed the offence of fraud, even 
before any threats are issued or sexual misconduct has occurred. Fraud has a very broad 
ambit under Scots law.117 Although more associated with financial crime, there is no reason 
why the offence cannot cover fraudulent conduct in this context. As with extortion, Scots 
law benefits from a broader concept of fraud than the equivalent English statutory offence, 
which requires a gain or loss of money or other property.118 
  This chapter has already examined the link between fraud and sexual offences in terms of 
consent. However, as stated above, the majority of cases will fall to be determined according 
to the general definition of consent as ‘free agreement’,119 rather than the specific consent 
provision relating to fraud as to the nature or purpose of the sexual act.120 
  Despite this, the common law offence may fill gaps where a sexual offence cannot be made 
out by prosecutors or where there is insufficient evidence to charge the accused with 
extortion. Notwithstanding this, in HM Advocate v McBride, the accused was charged with 
fraud alongside numerous extortion charges, which shows its relevance in practice.121 
  There are three elements to fraud: acting with a false pretence, achieving a definite practical 
result, and a causal connection between the pretence and result.122 The first criterion of acting 
with a false pretence is the act of deception itself and should be easily made out where the 
perpetrator uses a false identity or otherwise deceives the victim. However, where the victim 
is aware of the perpetrator’s true characteristics, there may be no deception to begin with 
and therefore no fraud. 
  The second criterion is bringing about a definite practical result. Would this cover situations 
where the perpetrator deceives the victim as to their identity or characteristics without 
seeking financial gain? In Adcock v Archibald123 it was held that pecuniary loss need not be 
                                                          
117 Gordon, Criminal Law para 25.01. 
118 Fraud Act 2006 s.5(2)(a). This is consistent with the Theft Act 1968: see D Ormerod and D Williams, 
Smith’s Law on Theft, 9th ed (2007) 135. 
119 2009 Act s.12. 
120 ibid s.13(2)(d). 
121 HM Advocate v Andrew McBride (n.91) per Lord Turnbull. 
122 Gordon, Criminal Law para 25.02. 
123 1925 JC 58. 
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proved for liability to arise for fraud: “any definite practical result” is sufficient.124 This 
means that fraud is committed so long as the victim is deceived into doing “some act he 
would not otherwise have done, or to become the medium of some unlawful act”.125 On this 
basis, this would cover a number of acts falling within the scope of online sexual extortion 
as set out in Chapter 1. This breadth was recently affirmed by the appeal court in Whyte v 
HM Advocate.126 The court dismissed the appellant’s plea to the relevancy that as the 
pleadings failed to aver any loss, the Crown had not libelled a definite practical result.127 The 
appellant contended that the victim “must be shown to be in a worse position than he or she 
otherwise would have been but for the fraud”.128 However, the court held that the principle 
in Adcock has the advantage of being “clear, objective…[and] sufficiently flexible”.129 The 
offence of fraud would consequently be committed where there is a “dishonest 
misrepresentation of fact which is designed to bring about the practical result which 
eventuates”.130 
  Despite its recently confirmed scope, fraud’s applicability to cases of online sexual 
extortion is perhaps of less relevance in light of the above statement that this would now be 
seen as negating consent and thus constitute a sexual offence under the 2009 Act. Although 
the conclusive presumption in relation to fraud appears somewhat narrow, a number of cases 
of online sexual extortion would still raise questions regarding consent by reference to the 
general definition of consent.131 In light of this, the relevance of common law fraud to online 
sexual extortion is therefore likely to be somewhat diminished. 
 
3.3 Non-Fatal Non-Sexual Offences Against the Person 
 
  As set out in the previous chapter, online sexual extortion extends beyond sexual and 
financial harms. Other harms can occur, including infringement of one’s right to privacy or 
damage to reputation. For the purposes of this thesis, these offences have been categorised 
                                                          
124 ibid at 61 per Lord Justice-General Clyde. 
125 ibid at 61 per Lord Hunter. 
126 2017 JC 262. 
127 ibid at para 4. 
128 ibid. 
129 ibid at para 15 per Lord Justice-Clerk Dorrian.  
130 ibid at para 16 per Lord Justice-Clerk Dorrian. 
131 2009 Act s.12. 
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as “non-fatal non-sexual offences against the person”,132 but could also be referred to as 
offences infringing liberty or as offences of threatening behaviour. 
 
3.3.1 Threatening Behaviour 
 
  The simple act of issuing a threat may in certain circumstances constitute a criminal 
offence. The law in this area has developed in a very piecemeal fashion with there being 
historic offences at common law, as well as specific statutory offences. These categories will 
briefly be considered in turn. 
 
3.3.1(a) Threats at Common Law 
 
  Although a threat backed by a demand would in most cases be charged as extortion, threats 
with nothing more could constitute the common law offence of threatening another 
individual. There is a distinction at common law between threats that are criminal per se and 
those threats that are only criminal when accompanied by a specific mental element.133 
  At common law various threats are criminal including those to “burn a man’s house…to 
put him to death, or to do him any grievous bodily harm, or to do any serious injury to his 
property, his fortune, or his reputation”.134 In such cases criminal liability arises at the 
moment the threat is made and this includes oral or written threats.135 
  The second category is threats that are criminal because of the accompanying intention of 
the accused. These tend to apply more to limited factual circumstances (such as where a 
witness is threatened into not giving evidence).136 
  In general, such offences are likely to be of little utility as the core element of online sexual 
extortion is a threat accompanied by a demand. Bare threats are more relevant in capturing 
preparatory conduct such as where the perpetrator seeks to intimidate the victim without 
                                                          
132 J Horder, “Rethinking non-fatal offences against the person” (1994) 14 OJLS 335 at 335. 
133 Gordon, Criminal Law para 48.01. 
134 Jas Miller (1862) 4 Irv 238 at 244. 
135 Gordon, Criminal Law para 48.01. 
136 ibid para 48.02. 
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making any demand, or where the demand is merely implied and difficulties arise in proving 
that a demand was communicated to the victim. 
 
3.3.1.(b) Statutory Threats 
 
  In addition to the aforementioned common law offences, some statutory provisions 
criminalise threats. Most relevant here is the broad offence of threatening and abusive 
behaviour.137 Key elements of this offence are that the perpetrator, A, behaves in a 
threatening or abusive manner, that this behaviour would likely cause a reasonable person 
to suffer fear or alarm, and that A either intends to cause such fear or alarm, or is reckless as 
to this.138 The legislation sets out that behaviour can include a single act or course of conduct, 
and includes communications as well as things done.139 
  The other relevant provision is section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. This makes 
it criminal to send by means of a public electronic communications network a message or 
other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character, or 
causes such messages to be sent.140 However, it is worth noting that this offence is currently 
under review by the Law Commission as part of their review into abusive and offensive 
online communications.141 
  These offences must be viewed as fallbacks. While the majority of online sexual extortion 
cases may involve conduct that these offences seek to criminalise, this cannot be said to be 
the primary wrong in these cases. Threats are just one aspect of what is wrong and imposing 
liability in respect of these offences fails to convey potential additional wrongs such as an 
unlawful demand, sexual threat, or broader coercive conduct. These offences are therefore 
relevant but ultimately do not engage with the more serious fundamental wrongs present in 
online sexual extortion cases. 
 
 
                                                          
137 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 s.38. 
138 ibid s.38(1). 
139 ibid s.38(3). 
140 Communications Act 2003 s.127. 
141 Law Commission Scoping Report on Abusive and Offensive Online Communications (Law Com No 381, 
2018) para 4.153. 
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3.3.2 Non-Consensual Distribution of Intimate Images 
 
  The offence of the non-consensual distribution of intimate images142 was recently 
introduced to deal with the growing problem of ‘revenge porn’ and criminalises the 
disclosure, or threatened disclosure, of an intimate photograph or film. This followed 
legislation introduced in England and Wales, which had already criminalised the non-
consensual disclosure of intimate sexual images.143 Despite these efforts, this response has 
been “largely ad hoc”144 by primarily targeting the vengeful acts of ex-partners. 
  Both ‘revenge porn’ and online sexual extortion are part of a group of increasingly 
prevalent offences comprising IBSA145 and can involve threats and violations of victims’ 
sexual autonomy, privacy and reputation. However, the problem has been described as one 
of “square pegs and round holes”.146 The wrongs are fundamentally different. The primary 
difficulty with this offence is that it only covers one particular type of online sexual 
extortion: where the threat is the distribution of intimate images or films. As a result, it has 
been said that “revenge porn laws do not seek to reach this conduct”147 and that sexual 
extortion is therefore unlikely to be prosecuted under new legislation.148  
  There are also issues from a labelling perspective. Can the non-consensual distribution of 
intimate images really be said to capture the wrong in online sexual extortion cases? Even 
where the distribution of images is part of the conduct, this offence does not capture 
additional wrongs relating to the creation of sexual extortion material or the coercion of the 
victim. It is further questionable whether this offence carries a serious enough penalty in 
cases where there is a greater degree of control, with it carrying a maximum sentence of five 
years on conviction on indictment.149 
 
  
                                                          
142 Abusive Harm and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s.2. 
143 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.33. 
144 C McGlynn, E Rackley and R Houghton, “Beyond ‘revenge porn’: the continuum of image-based sexual 
abuse” (2017) 25 Feminist Legal Studies 25 at 26.   
145 ibid, particularly at 27-29. 
146 B Wittes, C Poplin, Q Jurecic and C Spera, “Closing the sextortion sentencing gap: a legislative proposal” 
(Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2016) at 7. 
147 ibid. 
148 J Ledward and J Agate, “’Revenge porn’ and s.33: the story so far” (2017) 28 Ent. L.R. 40 at 40.   
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3.3.3 Stalking 
 
  An offence of stalking was introduced150 in response to growing concerns that stalking was 
not suitably captured by existing offences (e.g. breach of the peace), both from a labelling 
perspective and in terms of sentencing.151 For liability to arise the perpetrator’s conduct must 
cause the victim to suffer fear or alarm,152 and the conduct must be carried out either with 
the intention of causing this harm,153 or where in all the circumstances they ought to have 
known that this would have that effect.154 What types of acts might be captured by this 
offence? A non-exhaustive list is provided in the legislation.155 Most relevant to online 
sexual extortion would be contacting, or attempting to contact the victim or other person by 
any means,156 publishing any statement or other material relating or purporting to relate to 
the victim, or purporting to originate from the victim,157 monitoring the victim’s use of the 
Internet, email or any other form of electronic communication,158 and watching or spying on 
the victim or other person.159 There are parallels between stalking and online sexual 
extortion. Both may involve a course of conduct and much of the wrong of stalking can be 
derived from the “intrusion of privacy and personal autonomy”.160 Although not all cases of 
online sexual extortion constitute a course of conduct, the nature of the wrongdoing makes 
it difficult to envisage a one-off incident. Indeed, no examples reported in the media or 
literature have been isolated. Stalking may therefore be relevant insofar as it addresses more 
long-lasting conduct capable of causing fear, anxiety and emotional distress. 
  It is worth noting that where such conduct is persistent then this also may constitute 
harassment. However, under Scots law harassment is part of the civil law161 and criminal 
liability does not arise.162 
 
                                                          
150 2010 Act s.39(1). 
151 Gordon, Criminal Law para 48.16. 
152 2010 Act s.39(2). 
153 ibid s.39(3). 
154 ibid s.39(4). 
155 ibid s.39(6). 
156 ibid s.39(6)(b). 
157 ibid s.39(6)(c). 
158 ibid s.39(6)(d). 
159 ibid s.39(6)(i). 
160 Gordon, Criminal Law para 48.16 
161 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.8(2). 
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3.3.4 Coercive Control 
 
  In some instances, online sexual extortion may be committed by someone personally 
known to the victim. This conduct may be characterised as a form of coercive control and a 
means of retaining control over another. This may be to compel them to engage in additional 
sexual acts or prevent them from seeking judicial intervention or leaving the abuser.163 
Where intimate images are used to carry out extortion, these images are often the result of 
coercive and abusive behaviour.164 Legislation has recently been enacted in Scotland to 
counter this problem by creating a discrete offence of abusive behaviour.165 This offence 
applies to spouses or civil partners, and individuals living together as if spouses, or in an 
intimate personal relationship with one another.166 This is an obvious limitation of this 
offence in terms of targeting online sexual extortion. Only in a small proportion of cases will 
the perpetrator and victim be in such relationship. However, where online sexual extortion 
does occur in these circumstances it is possible that liability may arise for this offence. For 
this to happen there must be a course of abusive behaviour167 which a reasonable person 
would consider likely to cause the victim to suffer physical or psychological harm.168 The 
perpetrator must either intend for this course of behaviour to cause the necessary harm,169 or 
be reckless as to this.170 As with stalking, this offence can be committed in a number of 
different ways. Firstly, where the behaviour directed at the victim is violent, threatening or 
intimidating.171 Secondly, where the purpose of the behaviour is to produce one of the effects 
listed in the provision,172 or where a reasonable person would consider the behaviour to bring 
about one of the effects.173 Each of these effects could be relevant to online sexual extortion 
cases. These are: making the victim dependent on, or subordinate to the perpetrator;174 
isolating the victim from friends, relatives or other sources of support;175 controlling, 
regulating or monitoring the victim’s day-to-day activities;176 depriving the victim of, or 
                                                          
163 A Powell and N Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age (2017) 123. 
164 D Citron and M Franks, “Criminalizing revenge porn” (2014) 49 Wake Forest L.Rev.345 at 351.  
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restricting their freedom of action;177 and frightening, humiliating, degrading or punishing 
the victim.178 
 
3.4 Evaluation 
 
  What does the above discussion tell us about the criminal law response to online sexual 
extortion? That existing offences may be used to the extent that they impose liability for the 
individual criminal acts we see in such cases. However, this is quite different from the 
question of whether they capture the very nature of the wrongdoing. It is argued that they 
fall short on this ground. 
 
  On the first point of availability of offences, it has been shown that a multitude of offences 
may be used. This provides a number of options for imposing criminal liability. Charging an 
individual with multiple offences is not on its own problematic. 
  The relative breadth of offences such as extortion and fraud in contrast to the equivalent 
English law offences is useful. These offences may be used in a flexible manner, targeting 
individuals who extort or defraud victims, even where not done for financial gain. 
  In addition to these common law offences, a number of statutory sexual offences have been 
identified, particularly those based around sexual coercion and indecent communications. 
These offences are effective in terms of marking the perpetrator as a sexual offender. This is 
evidently important in responding to conduct that can cause serious harm to one’s sexual 
autonomy. However, even where an individual is not charged with a ‘sexual offence’, that 
the court can subject the offender to the notification requirement procedure in disposing of 
the case is important. 
  Recent statutory offences also go some way in encompassing conduct seen in cases of 
online sexual extortion. Where part of a pattern of broader coercive control in abusive 
relationships then the new abusive behaviour offence may be used. The offence of non-
consensual distribution of intimate images may also be relevant to the extent that it will 
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capture one type of online sexual extortion: where there is a threat to distribute intimate 
images. However, these offences are only effective in limited circumstances. 
 
  This leads us to the second issue: how suitable is the current criminal law response to online 
sexual extortion? In evaluating the criminal law response it is not enough that the law has 
marked something as wrongful:179 “what matters is not just that one has been convicted, but 
of what one has been convicted”.180 Although preferable to have offences that impose 
liability as opposed to none at all, these offences should not simply be accepted as a solution. 
Why? Because the offences a perpetrator is charged with may not suitably map onto the (i) 
nature of the wrong, and (ii) harm(s) experienced by the victim. This raises conceptual and 
practical concerns in terms of our characterisation of the wrong and labelling. 
 
  One problem with relying on existing individual offences to prosecute this conduct is that 
this approach may not adequately capture the nature of the wrongdoing nor the culpability 
of the offender. Parallels can be drawn here with recent legislation targeting domestic 
abuse,181 and modern slavery.182 In both instances offences already captured the individual 
criminal acts comprising this conduct. For example, offences of assault and threatening and 
abusive behaviour would both be relevant in a number of domestic abuse cases. This is 
similarly the case with modern slavery where there are offences of false imprisonment, 
extortion, assault and certain sexual offences. However, charging perpetrators of wrongs 
such as domestic abuse and modern slavery with these individual offences fails to convey 
the offender’s ongoing control and coercion of another individual. That is not to say that 
charging an individual with different offences such as extortion and causing a person to 
engage in sexual activity is never appropriate. In some cases it may be, and the combination 
of these offences would suitably reflect the culpability of the offender and harms experienced 
by the victims. However, it is particularly in those more serious cases of online sexual 
extortion, where there is more of an issue.183 
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  Building on this, it is important that the name given to an offence does more than simply 
just describe the prohibited conduct, but also “capture[s] the moral essence of the wrong 
involved”.184 This is referred to as the principle of “fair labelling” and is significant in terms 
of the accused, victim and wider public.185 In assessing the effectiveness of substantive 
criminal law, it is important to ensure that offences suitably label the criminal conduct and 
map onto the exact nature of the wrong. This is more challenging in this context given that 
there is no singular offence that responds to the conduct. This means that there is a greater 
risk that the offence(s) charged may not label the accused’s conduct in the most appropriate 
manner. 
  Making the perpetrator subject to notification requirements fulfils one key labelling aspect 
in terms of communicating to the wider public, potential employers and agencies186 that the 
individual is a sexual offender. However, this does not solve a broader concern. This is that 
the label alone does not “accurately describe the nature and magnitude of the wrong in 
question”.187 
  Could we not simply reflect this severity at the sentencing stage? While this would be 
possible in respect of some of the offences discussed above (e.g. extortion or causing an 
individual to engage in sexual activity), sentencing has been described as a “very blunt tool 
for assessing the level of a person’s wrongdoing”.188 One reason for this is that it may fail to 
accurately convey the offender’s culpability189 and this could be because it takes into account 
other considerations such as discounting or mitigating circumstances.  
  Furthermore, Chalmers and Leverick identify the symbolic significance of a name as a 
factor,190 as is the normative benefit of communicating to criminal justice professionals that 
such incidents should be taken seriously”.191 They offer a domestic abuse offence as an 
example of this, with it being important to mark out this conduct as being more culpable 
than assault. 
  Online sexual extortion is a clearer label. It communicates exactly what is wrong with the 
offender’s conduct and leaves the wider public in no doubt as to its seriousness. There is no 
                                                          
184 Horder (n.132) at 335. 
185 G Williams, “Convictions and fair labelling” (1983) 42 CLJ 85 at 85; J Chalmers and F Leverick, “Fair 
labelling in criminal law” (2008) 71 MLR 217 at 231. 
186 ibid Chalmers & Leverick at 234-235. 
187 Plaxton (n.179) at 470. 
188 Chalmers & Leverick (n.185) at 223. 
189 ibid. 
190 ibid at 241-242. 
191 ibid at 229. 
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ambiguity concerning the offender’s culpability, in contrast with the confusion that may arise 
where an offender is convicted of a non-sexual offence such as extortion. Even a serious 
sexual offence such as causing an individual to engage in sexual activity fails to bring out 
the possible violations to an individual’s private life, reputation, and liberty. 
 
  Finally, certain offences discussed above are serious as individual wrongs, yet in the 
context of online sexual extortion may be more accurately characterised as preparatory.192 
What is therefore neglected by charging a person with these offences (e.g. voyeurism; 
pornography offences) is the accused’s wider criminal motivations and arguably heightened 
culpability. For example, if the accused causes an individual to engage in sexual activity in 
order to film this activity and use it as a means of later coercing the victim then arguably this 
shows a greater degree of culpability than where this additional motivation is absent. 
 
  In summary, this chapter has explored the different offences that may impose liability in 
online sexual extortion cases. Beginning with sexual offences, it was found that acts of 
extortion will likely vitiate consent and that these offences benefit from recognising a 
victim’s sexual harms and in marking the offender as a sexual offender. While other offences 
were found to be relevant, each had shortcomings, either in terms of their rationales, 
accurately labelling the accused, the interests they protect, and only applying in limited 
circumstances. Although the criminal law is collectively able to combat this problem, doubts 
have been expressed about the manner in which this is done and it is concluded that this 
approach fails to convey the magnitude of the wrong.
                                                          
192 See above at 1.3.4. 
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4  ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS 
 
  This chapter will build on the previous three chapters by offering solutions to problems 
identified by this research. These can be separated into two categories: problems with the 
law and problems that cannot be resolved by legal redress. The chapter will outline these 
problems and propose how the criminal law can best respond to them. In addressing the latter 
point, this will draw on conclusions reached in the preceding chapter regarding the 
effectiveness of the existing criminal law response. It will do so by recommending a 
legislative solution that will help overcome shortcomings with the current legal framework. 
 
4.1 Legal Barriers 
 
  In addressing legal barriers, this chapter will examine issues with the criminal process, with 
some of the core problems arising after the perpetration of the criminal conduct. These 
include jurisdiction and complainer anonymity. 
 
4.1.1 Jurisdiction 
 
  As seen from this research, many perpetrators operate in different jurisdictions from their 
victims. Although offline sexual offences may span jurisdictions (e.g. sex-trafficking), this 
is made even more possible with online sexual offending.1 Any response to online sexual 
extortion must have regard to its cross-jurisdictional nature and tackle the “anonymity, high-
level privacy, invisibility, and the often lack of individual traces that characterize the Internet 
environment”.2 This is an area where online sexual extortion can be distinguished from 
similar offline conduct; traditional extortion does not pose “the same inter-jurisdictional and 
cyber-security problems”3 as online activities. This was a key issue in the Daniel Perry case 
in Scotland. The difficulty was not so much identifying the perpetrator, but rather reaching 
and extraditing them. In addition, there have been reports of online sexual extortion attacks 
                                                          
1 S Pegg and A Davies, Sexual Offences: Law and Context (2016) 175. 
2 A Barak, “Sexual harassment on the Internet” (2005) 23 Social Science Computer Review 77 at 85. 
3 B Wittes, C Poplin, Q Jurecic and C Spera, “Sextortion: cybersecurity, teenagers, and remote sexual 
assault” (Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2016) at 11. 
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from other jurisdictions targeting UK  citizens. These include the case of a perpetrator acting 
from the Netherlands who targeted victims in multiple jurisdictions4 and perpetrators 
operating from Kuwait.5 It is acknowledged that there are differences between having 
criminal offences able to target this conduct, and establishing jurisdiction over individuals 
operating in other territories.6 This is a problem applicable to cybercrime more generally and 
has been considered in detail elsewhere.7 Thus, for the purposes of this research, despite 
recognising this barrier, issues relating to online sexual extortion in Scotland will be 
explored without reference to jurisdiction and extradition. 
 
4.1.2 Complainer Anonymity 
 
  Complainer anonymity is another problem with the criminal process that can act as a barrier 
to justice being achieved. Victims may be reluctant to report abuse they have suffered if they 
believe that their identity may be disclosed. As the very nature of the offending in online 
sexual extortion cases concerns intimate details relating to the victim and their sexuality, it 
would be problematic if such details were to be publicised when reporting this to authorities. 
It is therefore necessary to ensure that victims can come forward without this risk. 
 
  The court has two means of preserving a complainer’s anonymity: at common law and 
under section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. These were examined by the High 
Court in A v Harrower8 after the complainer in a summary prosecution for extortion 
petitioned the nobile officium. When called in the Sheriff Court, media reports had published 
personal details pertaining to the complainer including his name, the nature of threats made 
against him, and photographs of him. While the sheriff initially made an order providing the 
complainer with anonymity and prohibiting publication of personal details, this was later 
recalled. This was because the sheriff did not believe himself to have the power when 
                                                          
4 H Agerholm, “Dutch man jailed for 10 years for blackmailing victims into webcam sex acts”, The 
Independent, (17 March 2017). Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/webcam-sex-
acts-blackmail-dutch-man-jailed-a7635051.html 
5 P Peachey, “Paedophiles blackmail thousands of UK teens into online sex acts”, The Independent, (20 
September 2013). Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/paedophiles-blackmail-
thousands-of-uk-teens-into-online-sex-acts-8827794.html  
6 J Clough, Principles of Cybercrime (2015) 475. 
7 ibid Ch 14: “Jurisdiction”; S Brenner, Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues and Outcomes (2012); S 
Brenner and BJ Koops (eds), Cybercrime and Jurisdiction: A Global Survey (2006). 
8 [2017] HCJAC 91. 
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exercising summary jurisdiction to make an order for anonymity at common law.9 In finding 
that that the sheriff did have such a power, the High Court in Harrower set out the law in 
Scotland: that the anonymity of a complainer is within the discretion of the court. This is a 
common law power that the court holds.10 The position here can be contrasted with that in 
England and Wales, where complainers in sexual offence cases have an automatic statutory 
right to lifelong anonymity.11 
  The court went on to say that they also have power deriving from section 11 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981.12 This provides that in addition to making a common law 
anonymity order, “the court may give such directions prohibiting the publication of that 
name or matter in connection with the proceedings as appear to the court to be necessary for 
the purpose for which it was so withheld”.13 
  In cases of online sexual extortion it is likely on the basis of this decision that extortion 
victims in Scotland will receive anonymity.14 This was supported in the Supreme Court by 
Lord Rodger who in Re Guardian News and Media Limited15 stated obiter that the evidence 
of a victim of blackmail or extortion would be an “obvious example” where the section 11 
power might be invoked.16 
 
  However, while in theory this appears to mitigate concerns that complainers may have in 
reporting such conduct, two issues remain. Firstly, this protection often comes too late. If 
the court does not make an order until proceedings begin, or an application is made, then 
this fails to safeguard the complainer’s anonymity at the reporting stage. This is in contrast 
to England where in respect of sexual offences, anonymity is automatically provided from 
the reporting stage. 
  Secondly, press and reputable media outlets will generally be aware of and respect the rules 
in relation to complainer anonymity. They will likely want to preserve working relationships 
they have with law enforcement agencies by adhering to these rules. However, the growth 
of the Internet is problematic and this has similarly been raised as an issue in domestic abuse 
                                                          
9 ibid at paras 10-11. 
10 ibid at paras 16-21. 
11 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 s.1, 2. 
12 Harrower at para 27. 
13 Contempt of Court Act 1981 s.11. 
14 Harrower at paras 24-25. 
15 [2010] 2 AC 697. 
16 ibid at para 31 per Lord Rodger 
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cases.17 An example of this in England is in the Ched Evans rape case, where following his 
trial nine people were convicted and fined after naming the complainer on Twitter.18 This 
problem will continue to arise. Although this example shows that individuals as well as 
media organisations may be liable for breaching an anonymity order, this may do little to 
reassure complainers. They may still worry that either their identity or personal details may 
be posted online, and that despite there being criminal sanctions to punish such individuals, 
this relies not only on knowing the identity of the person disclosing, but also on being able 
to prosecute them. Furthermore, as with the disclosure of sexual material in cases of online 
sexual extortion, once published on the Internet, there is no effective means of preventing 
its circulation or preventing others from seeing it: the damage is already done. 
  It is argued that placing complainer anonymity on a statutory footing in Scotland could 
increase the likelihood of victims of certain crimes reporting these to the police. When might 
such a rule apply? It would be necessary for it to firstly apply in respect of certain offences. 
This would allow for automatic anonymity from the moment an offence is reported to the 
police. This would most obviously apply to sexual offences, but should also extend to 
offences which may be sensitive in nature or have the potential to violate the privacy or 
reputation of the complainer (e.g. extortion, and recent statutory offences including coercive 
control, stalking and the non-consensual distribution of intimate images). It is interesting to 
note that in England the offence of non-consensual distribution of intimate images does not 
confer automatic anonymity on complainers since it is not regarded as a ‘sexual offence’.19 
In encouraging greater levels of reporting and recognising that complainers in other offences 
would benefit from anonymity, it is suggested that Scots law adopts a broader statutory 
regime. 
  However, it is not as straightforward as simply listing offences where anonymity should be 
conferred. In some cases the wider factual context ought to be taken into account, even where 
the reported offence would not typically attract anonymity. Such an approach would be 
consistent with current practice that an order should be made where “regardless of the 
outcome of the case, the disclosure of that party's identity would constitute an injustice to 
him; for example, where disclosure would endanger his safety, or would be commercially 
                                                          
17 M Hughes, “The News Media”, in H Hughes (ed), Domestic Abuse and Scots Law (2011) 205 at para 10-
35. 
18 F Perraudin, “Ched Evans: 10 men cautioned for revealing identity of accuser”, The Guardian, (26 Apr 
2017). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/26/ched-evans-10-men-cautioned-for-
revealing-identity-of-accuser. This was a breach of the complainer’s right to lifelong anonymity.  
19 J Ledward and J Agate, “’Revenge porn’ and s.33: the story of so far” (2017) 28 Entertainment Law 
Review 40 at 41. 
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ruinous”.20 An example can be seen in HM Advocate v M21 where the accused was charged 
with culpably and recklessly infecting the complainer with HIV and Hepatitis C. Due to the 
sensitive facts in this case, the court made an order preventing disclosure or publication of 
the name, age, address, nature of employment, ethnic origin or nationality of the 
complainer.22 Provision would therefore be needed to ensure that anonymity is not limited 
only to those offences listed in the statute, but could also apply where the wider factual 
context makes it appropriate in protecting the complainer. While there would be no practical 
means of providing for automatic anonymity in these cases, greater certainty could be 
provided to complainers by placing on a statutory footing those circumstances in which 
anonymity may be provided. This would allow for complainers to have a better 
understanding of the circumstances in which they will be able to remain anonymous through 
the judicial process.  
 
4.2 Non-Legal Barriers  
 
  Although this thesis has primarily approached this growing problem from a doctrinal 
perspective, it is acknowledged that legal remedies can only achieve so much.23 It will be 
argued that non-legal barriers represent significant obstacles for victims in obtaining justice. 
Unless these are overcome in coordination with legal reform, difficulties will remain. This 
section will consider issues concerning media coverage and under-reporting. 
 
4.2.1 Media Coverage 
 
  Although raising awareness is vital, media coverage remains a problem. It has the potential 
to downplay the severity of online sexual extortion or misrepresent it. This is important in a 
criminal law context: the media has “significant power in shaping policy”.24  There are two 
strands to this: the first is to focus on the actions of the victim, while the second is to provide 
                                                          
20 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] CSIH 43 at para 38 per Lord President Gill.  
21 2007 SLT 462. 
22 ibid at para 1 per Lord Hodge. 
23 A Powell and N Henry, “Sexual violence in the digital age: the scope and limits of criminal law” (2016) 25 
Social and Legal Studies 397 at 411. 
24 Pegg & Davies, Sexual Offences (n.1) 14. 
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narrow or inaccurate coverage of the activity. This section will reach the conclusion that 
such reporting contributes towards a narrow perception of it. 
   
  On this first point, a recurring problem with TFSV is the media’s tendency to blame victims 
for their actions where they have sent intimate images or performed sexual acts online.25 
This is a common reaction to stories of online sexual abuse.26 In the context of victims of 
IBSA, this has led to an attribution of responsibility for intimate images being circulated 
without their consent.27 This is easily done in online sexual extortion cases too.28 As set out 
in the previous chapter, the conduct may be similar. However, both the law and organisations 
must make clear that where this happens the wrong is not the sending of an image, nor 
engaging in sexual activity. Rather, it is the presence of a demand backed by a threat. While 
raising awareness of the problem and warning individuals of online dangers is commendable, 
this must convey a message that the conduct is wrong. One criticism of the reporting of 
online sexual extortion cases is that the underlying message detected from articles is that 
victims should be more careful, suggesting recklessness on their part as contributing to their 
own victimisation.29 This requires increased awareness in order to change entrenched 
attitudes regarding this activity. This in turn will prevent restriction of an individual’s 
positive sexual autonomy, whereby they may be wary of sexually expressing themselves for 
fear of falling victim to sexual extortion. 
 
  Additionally, the types of acts typically reported in the media possess certain 
characteristics. This reflects a broader issue that media coverage of crime is often inaccurate 
and “highly selective giving a false picture of criminality”.30 In this context these are often 
cases that, firstly, have child victims; and secondly, involve deception. This is symptomatic 
                                                          
25 N Bluett-Boyd, B Fileborn, A Quadara and S Moore, “The role of emerging communication technologies 
in experiences of sexual violence: a new legal frontier?” (Australian Institute of Family Studies Research 
Report No.23, 2013) at 34. Available at: https://aifs.gov.au/publications/role-emerging-communication-
technologies-experiences-sexual-violenc  
26 D Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (2014) 77; A Powell and N Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age 
(2017) 306. 
27 Citron ibid 77. 
28 Wittes et al (n.3) at 23. 
29 Europol European Cybercrime Centre, Online sexual coercion and extortion as a form of crime affecting 
children - Law Enforcement Perspective (May 2017) at 21. Available at: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/online_sexual_coercion_and_extortion_as_a_fo
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30 Pegg & Davies, Sexual Offences (n.1) 19. 
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of a wider problem with media coverage of sexual violence31 that “a considerable 
portion…of Internet dangers emphasizes young children as potential victims or focuses on 
violence, abduction, and deception”.32 
  Similarly, many reports of online sexual extortion cover those cases where the threat comes 
from overseas or an organised crime group, which may be less common in reality, but more 
prominently reported. This is likewise the case with advice provided by the NCA, which 
focuses on overseas threats while failing to mention activity originating in the UK.33 
  There are also concerns that media reports may be inaccurate, fail to use appropriate legal 
terminology, and sensationalise particular criminal activity.34 This has been observed with 
IBSA where “euphemistic, titillating or narrow language that produces a paradigmatic 
conceptualization of the behaviour ”35 has been criticised. These problems reinforce the idea 
that the media may misrepresent conduct and exclude coverage of alternative forms it may 
take. Disproportionate reporting may, for example, reinforce beliefs that the conduct is only 
a real threat to children or from overseas crime groups. At a broader level, in terms of 
emerging sexual offences, education and tackling existing misconceptions and entrenched 
attitudes among the wider public is necessary.36 This change must be brought about by 
organisations and bodies working both within the legal sphere and beyond. Only by doing 
this can people begin to truly understand the varied nature of the wrongful acts and the 
potential harmful impact that this conduct may have on different groups. 
 
4.2.2 Victim Reporting 
 
  Under-reporting has already been flagged a concern in this thesis.37 Overcoming this barrier 
is key. Ensuring that the law is suitably equipped to respond to the conduct is of little 
practical use if victims are unable to come forward and report instances of wrongdoing. In 
                                                          
31 T Serisier, “Sex crimes and the media” (2017) Oxford Research Encyclopaedia, Criminology And 
Criminal Justice. Online publication, available at: 
http://oxfordre.com/criminology/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079-
e-118  
32 J Wolak, D Finkelhor, K Mitchell and M Ybarra, “Online ‘predators’ and their victims: myths, realities, 
and implications for prevention and treatment” (2008) 63 American Psychologist 111 at 121-122  
33 NCA information page on “Sextortion”. Available at: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-
do/crime-threats/kidnap-and-extortion/sextortion-webcam-blackmail 
34 J Chalmers and F Leverick, “Fair labelling in criminal law” (2008) 71 MLR 217 at 228 
35 Powell & Henry (n.23) at 398. 
36 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law, 9th edn (2019) 377. 
37 See above at 2.2.2. 
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terms of cybercrimes more generally, factors such as embarrassment, lack of knowledge as 
to what to do, or simply shutting the situation out have been cited as relevant in explaining 
why victims may not report crimes.38 It is suggested that reform of complainer anonymity 
rules, as well as changes to the ways that the media reports cases, would both have the benefit 
of encouraging greater levels of reporting. 
 
4.3 Proposing a Solution 
 
  The final section of this work will draw on conclusions reached above and argue that a 
legislative response could be the answer. There are two issues to be addressed here: (i) what 
would the purpose and benefits of this be, and (ii) what would the content consist of? 
 
4.3.1 Purpose and Benefits 
 
  As concluded in the previous chapter, a gap exists at present. While current laws criminalise 
certain conduct present in online sexual extortion cases, they do not do so in the most 
appropriate manner. The introduction of a distinct offence would help overcome criticisms 
of the current law. The reasons for this will now be outlined below. 
 
  Firstly, although shown that a number of offences may be used in response to this conduct, 
parallels can be drawn with the introduction of the offence of non-consensual distribution of 
intimate images in both England and Wales, and Scotland.39 Existing offences already 
provided some means of support for victims,40 but failed to go to the root of the wrongdoing 
or treat this conduct as a sexual offence.41 In this respect, the introduction of a statutory 
offence would follow on from recent reform of sexual offences in Scotland and be consistent 
                                                          
38 D Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age (2007) 20. 
39 See above at 3.3.2 for a discussion of this offence. 
40 E.g. Communications Act 2003 s.127. 
41 Scottish Government, Crime and Justice, Recorded Crime in Scotland, 2017-18 (Sep 2018) at 36. 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/statistics/2018/09/recorded-crime-
scotland-2017-18/documents/recorded-crime-scotland-2017-18/recorded-crime-scotland-2017-
18/govscot%3Adocument/recorded-crime-scotland-2017-18.pdf?forceDownload=true  
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with the developing pattern of such offences becoming increasingly specific and detailed in 
nature.42 
  This would combat another problem. It has been argued that legislation targeting the non-
consensual distribution of intimate images should cover not only the sharing of these images, 
but also the creation.43 This offence would solve this by specifically targeting the non-
consensual creation of sexual material. 
 
  Secondly, it would clearly mark this conduct as a sexual offence. The practical significance 
of this has been addressed earlier in arguing for this categorisation. It is acknowledged that 
a key aspect of this - that an offender may still be made subject to the notification 
requirement procedure - can be met even where they are convicted of a non-sexual offence 
(e.g. extortion). However, the additional benefit of a distinct sexual offence to capture sexual 
extortion is that it would give the complainer the same level of protection as those in sexual 
offence cases. Protections include a prohibition on cross-examining the complainer, a 
restriction on submitting evidence related to previous sexual history, and being deemed a 
vulnerable witness. While these results may be achieved in respect of non-sexual offences, 
having a specific offence allows this to be done automatically without need for application, 
thereby providing complainers with greater certainty. 
 
  Thirdly, there are important consequences from a labelling perspective. One criticism with 
prosecuting online sexual extortion with existing offences is that it violates the principle of 
fair labelling. The reasons for this have been stated, but to summarise it would accomplish 
the following aims: to communicate the severity of the conduct, to make a symbolic 
statement about the wrong, to raise awareness of the activity, and to more accurately reflect 
the offender’s culpability to those individuals operating both within and outwith the justice 
system. 
 
  Fourthly, legislative intervention would help raise awareness and therefore act as a means 
of eliminating one of the non-legal barriers outlined earlier. Having a specific offence with 
a clear label that describes the wrong of the conduct would combat issues relating to media 
                                                          
42 L Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law (2016) 287. 
43 C McGlynn and E Rackley, “Image-based sexual abuse” (2017) 37 OJLS 534 at 556. 
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coverage and be of educational benefit. It would also assist public bodies who would be able 
to better track the conduct including how often it is reported, prosecuted, and the number of 
convictions.44 Increasing awareness can be vital and can be seen through the introduction of 
the offence of the non-consensual distribution of intimate images. Prior to this offence being 
introduced in Scotland there had only been five reported convictions for this conduct,45 yet 
421 instances were reported in the period 2017-18 following its enactment in July 2017.46 
 
  Finally, legislation would provide benefits in terms of sentencing. This thesis will not 
suggest how perpetrators should be sentenced. However, introducing a specific offence 
would mitigate two related concerns.  
  Firstly, it would help ensure that the disposal corresponds to the severity of the wrongdoing. 
Although certain offences such as sexual coercion or extortion may carry severe sentences, 
this is not the case with all of the offences discussed above. In particular, while it may be 
tempting for prosecutors to charge some online sexual extortion conduct with the new non-
consensual distribution of intimate images offence, this offence is not intended to confer 
such severe sentences as are perhaps merited by the conduct seen in the cases discussed. 
  The second problem relates to an issue raised in the third chapter. This is that having a 
number of offences that can be used in response to online sexual extortion cases may lead to 
greater disparity in the sentencing of offenders. This could to some extent be remedied by 
an individual offence and would also help enhance predictability in respect of the 
consequences of engaging in the proscribed conduct. 
 
  Before considering the content of a new offence, opportunity will be taken to consider two 
criticisms that may be levelled at this proposal. One is from an over-criminalisation 
perspective: is the creation of an additional offence really desirable, particularly when 
existing offences already provides a means of redress? A new offence would not be an 
example of over-criminalisation in the traditional sense. Rather it would be an example of 
“more intensive criminalisation of areas that are already covered by the criminal law, as new 
                                                          
44 B Wittes, C Poplin, Q Jurecic and C Spera, “Closing the sextortion sentencing gap: a legislative proposal” 
(Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2016) at 7. 
45 D Leask, “Calls for legislation to tackle the spread of ‘revenge porn’”, The Herald, (11 April 2014). 
Available at: 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13155032.Callforlegislationtotacklethespreadofrevengeporn/  
46 Scottish Government, Recorded Crime (n.41) at 2. 
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offences are created to recognise more specific forms of wrongdoing”.47 However, such an 
approach is criticised by Husak who argues that “overlapping crimes” are problematic.48 The 
main concern raised is that this can lead to “charge stacking” and unduly severe sentences 
for offenders who may be charged with multiple offences.49 Interestingly, it is suggested that 
a new offence may have the opposite effect in this jurisdiction by providing a singular 
offence with which a perpetrator may be charged with, as opposed to multiple offences 
(including a mixture of sexual offences, dishonesty offences and offense against the person) 
as seen at present. It is also contended that the argument in favour of a legislative solution 
has been made out by reference to fair labelling, categorisation, sentencing, increased 
awareness, and more accurately capturing the essence of the wrong; factors which Husak 
fails to mention as being relevant in questioning the need for “overlapping offences”.50 
  The second concerns responding to conduct in an ad hoc manner.51 It is acknowledged that 
there is the need for a comprehensive and over-arching review of the law relating to sexual 
cybercrime - which would encompass much of IBSA - but also reach beyond this to include 
TFSV. However, the law faces a difficult task in this area. While a review would allow for 
a more principled consideration of this offending, this would take some time and the law 
cannot allow itself to fall further behind when it comes to cybercrime. Furthermore, the 
proposals set out in this thesis and undertaking a review are not mutually exclusive. It is 
hoped that this thesis could assist with future research and encourage a broader review of 
this field. 
 
4.3.2 Content 
 
  What would a legislative answer look like? This final section will resolve this question by 
drawing on the benefits set out above and the problems identified with the existing law. 
 
  Firstly, it is important that a statutory offence does not make any distinction based on the 
age or gender of the relevant parties, nor the relationship between them. As shown, one 
limitation of existing offences is that some target specific types of conduct. For example, 
                                                          
47 Farmer, Modern Criminal Law (n.42) 105. 
48 D Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limitations of the Criminal Law (2008) 37 
49 ibid 38. 
50 ibid 37ff. 
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coercive control only applies to individuals in an intimate relationship together, while 
grooming is aimed at protecting children. This is not a criticism of these offences. They have 
clear aims in terms of the conduct they criminalise and much of the rationale of these 
offences is to raise awareness that these acts are criminal, to more effectively label the 
criminal wrongs, and to make a symbolic statement about the culpability of perpetrators. 
However, as established in the first chapter, online sexual extortion is not confined to one 
particular group of people, nor any specific context. 
 
  Secondly, legislation should clearly reflect online sexual extortion’s status as a sexual 
offence. This is consistent with the conclusion reached in Chapter 2 that this conduct must 
necessarily involve some violation of an individual’s sexual autonomy, either through a 
threat to do something, or a demand having a similar effect. By unambiguously categorising 
the offence in this way, it avoids problems English law has encountered with its offence of 
non-consensual distribution of intimate images not being classified as a sexual offence.52 
From a Scottish perspective, this would mitigate concerns over ‘non-sexual offences’ (e.g. 
extortion) being used to target what is primarily a sexual wrong. 
 
  Thirdly, ensuring sufficient breadth is key. While this thesis has focused solely on the issue 
of online sexual extortion for the reasons set out in Chapter 2, any legislative answer must 
be framed in broader terms. Although technology has allowed this conduct to be perpetrated 
in multiple ways and in a more pervasive manner, it is still possible that this conduct may 
either be carried out offline (or at least partly offline). In particular, conduct may begin online 
but later continue offline. It is the course of conduct that must be captured. In proposing 
legislation there would be no reason to exclude offline conduct other than that it may occur 
less frequently and be more difficult to carry out without using technology to some extent.53 
These are not sound reasons for doing this and the offence, although targeted at conduct 
which primarily manifests itself online, should not be restricted to this. 
 
                                                          
52 Ledward & Agate (n.19) at 41. 
53 In a study into victims of both online and offline sexual extortion it was found that even in those cases that 
originated offline, 98% of respondents reported being coerced through technology by the perpetrator:  
J Wolak and D Finkelhor, “Sextortion: findings from a survey of 1,631 victims”  (Crimes Against Children 
Research Center, 2016) at 11. Available at: https://www.wearethorn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Sextortion_Report.pdf 
 
 
90 
 
  Fourthly, what would the proscribed conduct be? Sexual extortion is the real issue. While 
individual offences criminalise specific wrongs such as voyeurism, grooming, and the non-
consensual distribution of intimate images, this research has exposed the lack of any offence 
that really gets to grips with prolonged sexual extortion. A statutory offence could remedy 
this by criminalising the pattern of conduct, as opposed to simply individual acts. This would 
recognise the ways that the Internet and technology may cause continuing harm. The offence 
of causing an individual to engage in sexual activity fails to capture prolonged spells of 
control. The wrongful act in cases of online sexual extortion is not just that of causing a 
person to engage in sexual activity. As a result, liability should not arise simply at the 
moment an individual engages in such activity against their will. It is for this reason that the 
Home Office stated that the rationale for a separate offence of coercive control was to set 
out “the importance of recognising the harm caused by coercion or control, the cumulative 
impact on the victim and that a repeated pattern of abuse can be more injurious and harmful 
than a single incident of violence”.54 Given the earlier examination of the nature of the 
harms, this is equally appropriate in this context. 
 
  How might such an offence be drafted? The content of a new offence could draw inspiration 
from recently introduced legislation aimed at criminalising coercive control. Coercive 
control was defined by the Home Office as “[c]ontrolling or coercive behaviour [that] does 
not relate to a single incident, it is a purposeful pattern of behaviour which takes place over 
time in order for one individual to exert power, control or coercion over another”.55 These 
are the type of acts in the context of online sexual extortion that it has been argued for the 
reasons above are not adequately captured by existing laws. 
 
  It is proposed that the actus reus retains similarities with the common law offence of 
extortion. The wrongful act is the perpetrator’s demand backed by a threat. What 
distinguishes this from extortion is the specific requirement of a sexual element. As proposed 
in the first chapter, online sexual extortion should be characterised by the presence of a threat 
and demand, at least one of which is sexual in nature. In ensuring consistency with existing 
legislation on sexual offences, ‘sexual’ for the purposes of this offence should be defined as 
                                                          
54 Home Office, Controlling or Coercive Behaviour in an Intimate or Family Relationship: Statutory 
Guidance Framework (Dec 2015) 3. 
55 ibid. 
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it is in the 2009 Act. This by reference to its ordinary meaning: whether or not a reasonable 
person would, in all the circumstances of the case, consider the act sexual.56  
  The actus reus of the offence would be satisfied where either (i) A makes a demand from 
B, and this demand is backed by a sexual threat, or (ii) where A makes a sexual demand 
from B, and this sexual demand is backed by a threat. 
  This would be a differentiated offence that could be committed in a number of ways, 
thereby reflecting the various types of conduct present in online sexual extortion cases. For 
this reason, the terms “threats” and “demands” should be broadly construed57 in order to give 
the provisions a degree of flexibility in capturing the various types of threats and demands. 
In order to supplement the wording in the offence, a non-exhaustive list of the types of acts 
falling within the scope of “sexual demand” and “sexual threat” would be beneficial. 
   
  A suggestion as to how this could be set out is provided below: 
 
  “Sexual demand” would include, among others, demands by A that B: 
- provides a sexual image or video-recording 
- engages in a sexual act 
- accesses or views pornography 
  “Sexual threat” would include, among others, threats by A to: 
- send, publish, or distribute a sexual image or video-recording of B 
- commit a sexual offence against B 
- release other sexual material relating to B 
 
The following observations are expected to assist with how this offence may appear in 
legislation: 
- In recognising different modes of communications, demands and threats may be 
communicated in writing or verbally. 
                                                          
56 2009 Act s.60(2) 
57 See 3.2.1; Silverstein v HM Advocate 1949 JC 160 
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- “Sexual image” would be an image “produced by whatever means and whether or 
not a moving image” as defined for the purposes of the offence of coercing a person 
into looking at a sexual image.58 
- “Sexual act” would include acts engaged in whether by B alone, by B with A, or by 
B with a third party. This would also include exposure of B’s genitals or buttocks. 
- Including the term “sexual material” ensures that a threat to distribute material that 
may not be an image or video is included within the scope of “sexual threat”. This 
might include personal information relating to B’s sexuality such as sexual 
orientation and sexual preferences, or images or recordings of sexual 
communications from B. 
- Reference is made to “psychological harm”59 as it encompasses a wider range of 
mental harms than fear, alarm and distress. This would ensure that harms are 
recognised in respect of invasions of privacy or damage to reputation, both of which 
may cause B psychological harm (e.g. anxiety). However, physical harm should also 
be included in order to capture situations where the victim is coerced into physically 
harming themselves. 
 
In terms of the mens rea, the starting point should be that the perpetrator intends the conduct 
(i.e. the demand backed by a threat). Thus, A must intentionally communicate to B a demand 
backed by a threat in accordance with the conduct element stated above. This means that 
only cases where A specifically targets and directs threats and demands at B will be caught 
by the offence. Drawing on the recently introduced abusive behaviour offence, a requirement 
that A either does this with the intention to cause physical or psychological harm to B, or is 
reckless as to whether B suffers such harm, is recommended. This will allow for a wide 
range of motives to be included, and does not limit the criminal activity to only cases where 
A intends to cause harm to B. As has been shown, in some cases this intention is absent and 
A acts for an altogether different motive. This does not reduce B’s harm and this is why 
recklessness as to the harm should suffice. 
 
It is hoped that an offence based on these recommendations may help address the issue of 
online sexual extortion in Scotland. As well as providing a singular offence for convicting 
                                                          
58 2009 Act s.6(3) 
59 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 s.1(3) 
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individuals that suitably reflects the scale of the wrongdoing, the harms suffered by victims, 
and appropriately labels the conduct, this would have the additional benefit of raising 
awareness of the behaviour and sending a message as to its seriousness. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
  This thesis has sought to examine online sexual extortion as an emerging species of conduct 
and identify how the criminal law can best respond to this issue in Scotland. In achieving 
this, the research has proposed a definition of online sexual extortion, identified and assessed 
the harms, undertaken an evaluation of the current criminal law response, and suggested 
possible improvements to the legal response. 
 
  The first chapter aimed to define online sexual extortion. Drawing on existing definitions 
and terminology used in the literature, a broad definition of online sexual extortion was 
proposed. This reflects the different ways that the conduct may violate an individual’s sexual 
autonomy and ensures that this is the defining element of the wrong. In order to give this 
definition substance, a typology of the different modes of perpetration was set out, with the 
benefit of providing illustrative examples of the many ways in which the wrong may be 
perpetrated. 
 
  The second chapter was broader in scope. The first aim was to map online sexual extortion 
in Scotland. This was done by reviewing existing literature, and then through an analysis of 
statistical data. While some statistical evidence and media coverage pointed towards this 
being a growing threat in Scotland, academic literature and public reports have paid little 
attention to it. Factors such as under-reporting, problems with recording practices, and the 
lack of a distinct offence were found to make it difficult to assess recorded cases. This fuels 
the need for a detailed consideration of the issue in Scotland. 
Focus then turned to the harms of online sexual extortion. The second aim of the chapter 
was to identify the interests threatened by this conduct. The development of sexual extortion 
as a distinct wrong was shown, and it was submitted that technological developments altered 
the nature of this wrong and the harms felt. It was argued that breach of sexual autonomy 
represents the primary harm, and that online sexual extortion must be characterised as a 
sexual offence for both conceptual and practical reasons. However, it additionally has the 
potential to violate financial, privacy and reputational interests, particularly given the threat 
it poses from overseas organised crime groups and to individuals’ virtual identities. 
 
 
95 
 
 
  The overarching aim of the third chapter was to evaluate the criminal law response to 
online sexual extortion in Scotland. It was firstly shown that the conduct straddles different 
offence groups and cannot be neatly placed in one category, this being consistent with the 
findings in the second chapter. Various offences were found to deal with features prevalent 
in online sexual extortion cases. In evaluating these offences, the conclusion reached is that 
the problem is not so much a gap in the law, but rather a strained application of the law. The 
legal tools are there; however, existing offences do not address the conduct in the most 
appropriate manner. This is because they fail to: (i) accurately label the conduct, (ii) convey 
the seriousness of it, (iii) capture the nature of the wrongs, and (iv) reflect the harms 
experienced by victims. 
 
  The purpose of the fourth chapter was firstly to look beyond substantive criminal law. It 
was argued that legal reform can only achieve so much. Other barriers to progress being 
made had to be considered. These fell into two categories: barriers relating to the criminal 
process and non-legal barriers. While only reform of the first category can be achieved 
through legal redress, the two categories are inter-related. Under-reporting could be 
mitigated if complainer anonymity was guaranteed through suggested reform of these rules. 
Similarly, while media reporting may perpetuate lack of awareness or understanding of the 
issues, these concerns could be overcome by legislative intervention.  
  In terms of providing a solution to the problem of online sexual extortion, reform of the 
law was proposed. It was argued that there is scope for a discrete offence dealing with sexual 
extortion. The principles to which this should conform to were set out and it was suggested 
that a new offence would not be vulnerable to the same criticisms as the existing criminal 
law framework. It would more accurately label the conduct, clearly mark it as a sexual 
offence, reflect the harms suffered by victims, and provide benefits in terms of sentencing 
and raising awareness. It is hoped that thought may therefore be given to the proposals 
outlined in this thesis and that improvements can be made to the law’s response to this 
species of wrongdoing, as well as other types of IBSA and TFSV.
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